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Sex, Campaign Contributions, and State Courts of Last Resort

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Abstract

Women have struggled to be elected at the federal, state, or local levels—with the notable exception of State Courts of Last Resort (SCLR), where women have experienced (comparative) electoral success. While scholars have sought to explain this relative success, one factor often overlooked is the role of campaign contributions and whether women are outraising their male counterparts. Using an original database of campaign contributions from 1989 to 2020, we seek to shed more light on female candidate fundraising in SCLR elections, both in terms of amounts raised and who is contributing to these campaigns. After controlling for other factors, we find that female candidates outraise male candidates overall, primarily—but not exclusively—by outraising men on small donations. We also find that incumbency and professional experience do not help women outraise men, and we find that the fundraising success of female SCLR candidates is primarily with White Anglo women. We conclude by offering insights on where the study of sex and judicial elections should go next.

Keywords

state Supreme Court elections, judicial processes and institutions, women and elections, election donor behavior

Introduction

In 1990, only 10 percent of SCLR justices were women.[1] As of May 2024, 43 percent of SCLR justices are women. In contrast, only 32 percent of state legislators, and 26 percent of governors, identify as women.[2,3] Furthermore, several states—such as Wisconsin and Michigan—having majority-female high courts, whereas no state has a majority-female legislature.[4] Though women remain proportionally underrepresented in judicial office, women have still had comparatively more electoral success in SCLR elections. Understanding this relative success is important, given the crucial role of SCLR in state politics (Allegrucci and Kunz 2012) and judicial legitimacy (Gibson 2012; Nownes and Glennon 2016, etc.), the greater influence the public exerts on SCLR via popular election (Baird 2001; Reilly and Walker 2010; etc.), and the improvement in democratic legitimacy when barriers to representation are removed (Fox and Lawless 2011; Boyd 2016; etc.). Consequently, scholars have sought to explain why women do (relatively) well in obtaining judicial office. Previous studies have focused on voter stereotypes about female SCLR candidates, whether positive (e.g., Frederick and Streb 2008) or negative (Gill et al. 2011; Walsh et al. 2016); the use of appointments to fill vacancies and diversify the high courts (e.g., Holmes and Emery 2006); and whether judicial offices are more open to female representation than other offices (Reid 2004; Williams 2009; etc.).

What is less studied is the role of campaign contributions in women's successes in SCLR elections. Extant studies of state (e.g., Jenkins 2007) and federal (e.g., Crespin and Deitz 2010) legislative elections find that women do at least as well as their male counterparts in campaign fundraising, and the relatively few studies of state judicial elections have found the same. However, the few studies which have examined sex-based differences in

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fundraising in judicial elections have been limited to a specific state (e.g., Frederick and Streb 2008) or have looked at sex only as a control variable (e.g., Solberg and Stout 2021). Bonneau (2007) and others have long concluded that raising money is crucial to competing successfully in state judicial elections, and—as shown in state legislative elections—the ability of women to successfully fundraise is even more crucial to the likelihood of victory (e.g., Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013). One research question is do female candidates for SCLR raise more money than men in the aggregate?

Scholars examining fundraising differences between men and women in other elections have focused on the role of small donations—donations of $200 or less (Sanbonmatsu and Rogers 2020)—versus large donations. The evidence from state and federal legislative elections indicates that women rely primarily on small-donor networks (Jenkins 2007; Thomsen and Swers 2017), particularly from individual donors (Heerwig and Gordon 2018), as women have borne the brunt of a gendered electoral financing scheme (Murrias et al., 2019) that favors male candidates. Combined with the relative newness of women as viable candidates, women historically rely upon small donations, and more of them, to outraise men (Sanbonmatsu and Rogers 2020). However, the greater push by political parties to elect more women to public office (e.g., Crowder-Meyer and Cooperman 2018), and the rise of women's issues groups with the same goal (Hassell and Visalvanich 2019; Karpowitz et al. 2017; Sanbonmatsu and Rogers 2020), may mean that women candidates are not as dependent on small donations as they were in the past. What scholars have not examined are these theories in the context of SCLR elections. Our other research question, then, is do women in SCLR elections rely more on small donations in campaign fundraising?

Using a unique data set, we examine aggregate fundraising by SCLR candidates from 1989 to 2020 to determine whether women outraise men in these elections, and—if so—how. We posit that women will outraise men, and women will rely primarily, but not exclusively, on small donations—particularly from individual donors—to accomplish this. After controlling for other factors, we mostly find support for our hypotheses: women do outraise men in these races, regardless of the size of the donation, and women rely primarily—but not exclusively—on small donations to achieve this success. We also find that women rely primarily on individual donors, rather than non-individual donors (political parties, interest groups, etc.), and it is individual donors who drive women's success in drawing donations. We also find that the fundraising advantage enjoyed by women is primarily found with White (Anglo) women. However, and paradoxically, we find that female challengers outraise their incumbent counterparts, suggesting that the Jill Robinson Effect may not be present in SCLR elections. We conclude by suggesting avenues for future research.

Small Donations, Sex, and SCLR Elections

Campaigning for election resources is an art form, which includes strategy, development, and effective communication to mobilize supporters (Francia et al., 2003; Hassell and Visalvanich, 2019; Herrnson et al., 2003). Donors are strategic (Barber et al. 2017; Rhodes et al. 2018; etc.), with finite resources: even the largest donor groups must prioritize to whom they contribute, especially in low-salience (Reid 2004; Rock and Baum 2010) and low-information (Hughes 2019; McDermott 1997) elections—which SCLR elections heretofore have been. Consequently, donors are less willing to contribute to unknown entities, and the newness of women in the judiciary makes them more of a "risk" for donors. Women in other elections (e.g., legislative elections) have long relied on small donations due to the gendered electoral financing scheme: the lower access to election capital, lack of access to traditional donor networks, and bias against women among party leaders and outside donors (Murrias et al. 2019). Shut out of big-money donor networks, women must work harder at fundraising (e.g., Piscopo et al. 2022), but women on average—including non-incumbents—raise as much as men in the aggregate (Boyea 2017; Sanbonmatsu and Rogers 2020).

For women to do well in cultivating these small donors, research from legislative elections shows that women are more likely to self-select in whether they want to run (Fox and Lawless 2004, 2011; Jenkins 2007), with only the most qualified and "electable" women choosing to run (Lawless and Pearson 2008; Reid 2010). If women are more likely to possess greater professional credentials (i.e., previous political experience), they could be viewed more favorably by the public—and donors. The success of women in winning elected office creates a "Jill Robinson Effect" (Anzia and Berry 2011), in which incumbent women mentor other women, creating a larger pool of qualified female candidates (Curriden 2010) and improving the odds that donors will be willing to give to other female candidates, regardless of incumbency.

We posit that these phenomena are present in SCLR races as well. One reason is because of the correlation between small donations and women as donors. Women are more likely to provide small amounts to political campaigns (Heerwig and Gordon 2018), and women generally give to female candidates (Thomsen and Swers 2017). If women are most likely to donate to other women, female SCLR candidates have a built-in network of small donations into which they can mine for contributions.

The gendered electoral financing scheme present in other elections may be present in SCLR elections, which

will drive female SCLR candidates to seek small donations. Women—emerging as high-profile attorneys and legal actors only in the past few decades—are less likely to have access to the large donation pools that their male counterparts have long enjoyed. Consequently, women SCLR candidates are more likely to rely on small donations to fund their campaigns (Thomsen and Swers 2017). However, voters hold SCLR candidates to higher professional standards than in, for instance, legislative elections (Gill et al. 2011; Hughes 2019), so women in SCLR elections should be as likely as they are in other elections to self-select. Consequently, the higher professional qualifications for SCLR office, and the ability to view the success women in other elected offices have with attracting small donations, will allow women to outraise their male counterparts. Additionally, the posited self-selection on the part of female candidates cultivates small donors beyond just women. As female SCLR candidates achieve electoral success, they may create a network of donors who can be solicited by other female SCLR candidates. This allows other female candidates to outraise their male counterparts, primarily using small donations.

Hypothesis 1. Women will raise more money than men in SCLR elections.
Hypothesis 2a. Women will outraise men from small donation sources.
Hypothesis 2b. Women will have a higher number of small donations than men.
Hypothesis 2c. Women will have a higher percentage of their total donations come from small donor sources.

Large Donations, Sex, and SCLR Elections

Although we posit that women **primarily** rely on small donations, there are reasons to suggest that women do not rely **exclusively** on small donations. The correlation between the sex of the donor and the sex of the candidate in other elections, and the reliance by female candidates on small-donor networks, suggest that there is a connection between the desire to improve women's representation and consistent donations to women's campaigns. However, the same push for diversity that motivates many small donors now motivates patterns of political party giving in partisan elections, as both major parties and their allies (Crowder-Meyer and Cooperman 2018) are willing to back female candidates for public office (Hassell and Visalvanich 2019; Karpowitz et al. 2017; Crowder-Meyer and Cooperman 2018; Sanbonmatsu and Rogers 2020). Women in other elections have greater access to donor networks willing to contribute large amounts of money to a campaign than in the past (Reid 2004). With the rise in the importance of SCLR elections, political parties and interest groups may be more willing to support female SCLR candidates.

There is also the effect of incumbency on large donations as more women win SCLR office. In most other elections, incumbents do better at fundraising than challengers, as incumbents have greater name recognition and a voting record, making them a known entity for donors (Frederick and Streb 2011; Gill and Eugenis 2019). Therefore, female incumbents should be able to better access large donor networks (major law firms, state political parties, etc.) and rely less on small donations. Additionally, incumbency means experience, which can combat any negative stereotypes about the political knowledge of female candidates (Lawless and Pearson 2008; Piscopo et al. 2022; etc.).

However, there are two reasons why women may not significantly utilize large-money donors in SCLR races. One is the strategic nature of donors. Despite increases in female lawyers and judges, women are still "new" to state judiciaries. Incumbency is a good example. Male incumbents are likely to have been judges longer than female incumbents. This longevity means that the behavior of male incumbents is better known to strategic donors. Consequently, donors are likely to contribute to a male judge. Even when there is no male incumbent in a race, women may still be at a fundraising disadvantage because of the "old boys' club" of donors which have long contributed to male candidates (Murrias et al. 2019; Nguyen 2019; etc.). Consequently, female candidates for SCLR are likely to still rely on small donations.

In the case of political parties and interest groups, there is also the fact that most SCLR elections are held in midterm and presidential election years—years in which parties and groups may need to contribute substantially to other state elections. While SCLR elections have increased in importance in recent years, these elections remain lower-information and lower-turnout affairs. Groups and political parties may decide that their finite resources are better spent on more high-profile elections, such as gubernatorial or congressional races. If the gendered electoral financing scheme affects the ability of female SCLR candidates to solicit large donations, then these women will rely on small donations to be successful in SCLR election fundraising.

Individuals, Large Donations, and SCLR Elections

There is a way in which the gendered electoral financing scheme may not negatively impact women in terms of competitiveness with soliciting large donations. If women are shut out of non-individual large donor networks, they can still obtain large donations by soliciting contributions

from monied individuals. We posit that large-money individual donors in SCLR elections are part of an investor class (Francia et al., 2003) who view contributing to successful SCLR candidates as buying "access" to these future justices by setting the judicial agenda (Boyea 2017). If the goal of these donors is greater access, it makes more sense to donate directly to candidates. Additionally, if the Jill Robinson Effect means that only the "most qualified" women are running, individual investor donors may view women as a "good" bet for winning SCLR office. If women in SCLR elections have been shut out by non-individual donors, they may turn to individual donors to obtain the large donations to supplement the small donations in which we posit women have an advantage.

Contribution limits for individuals for SCLR campaigns also tend to be higher than for other offices,[5] and women may be able to use this to their advantage. Coupled with the fact that there are more individual donations in SCLR elections than non-individual donations, the implied correlation between individual donation and small donations in the literature for other elections is not strong. The median (inflation-adjusted) individual donation amount in our data is $190, close to the small-donation threshold of $200. If women in SCLR elections have been shut out by non-individual donors, they may turn to individual donors to obtain the large donations to supplement the small donations in which we posit women have an advantage. In short, women outraise men in large donations, but this advantage is because of individual donations, not the financial backing of non-individuals.

Hypothesis 3a. Women will outraise men in large donations.

Hypothesis 3b. Women will receive a greater number of large donations than men.

Hypothesis 3c. Women will have a higher percentage of their total donations come from large donor sources.

Hypothesis 4a. Women will outraise men in donations from individuals.

Hypothesis 4b. Women will receive more donations from individuals than men.

Hypothesis 5a. Men will outraise women in donations from non-individuals.

Hypothesis 5b. Men will receive a greater number of non-individual donations than women.

The Intersection of Race, Ethnicity, and Sex in Campaign Contributions in SCLR Elections

Although we posit that women will outraise men in SCLR elections, across small- and large donation sources, one aspect of fundraising we have not discussed—and one generally ignored in the SCLR literature—is the role of a candidate's race or ethnicity in receiving financial support. Black and Brown candidates are even more underrepresented in SCLR than women: as of 2024, 19 states do not have Black or Brown justices, including 13 states in which over 20 percent of the state's population identify as Black or Brown.[6] If gendered representation can enhance institutional legitimacy with historically marginalized groups (e.g., Scherer and Curry 2010), understanding the role of race and ethnicity in SCLR campaigns is critical to understanding the role of campaign contributions in SCLR elections.

The scholarly evidence from other elections (e.g., Johnson et al. (2012) and congressional elections) suggests that non-whites, including non-white women, struggle to receive campaign contributions, despite high levels of political activity (Brown 2014; Farris and Holman 2014, etc.) and the rise of campaign training programs to help Black and Brown women run for office (e.g., Sanbonmatsu 2015). The rising costs of political campaigns couple with the (on average) lower socioeconomic statuses of Black women and Hispanic women/Latinas to depress the amounts of money these groups contribute to campaigns (Scott 2022). This is problematic for Black and Brown candidates, as they rely on donors from marginalized communities (Fraga and Hassell 2021; Grumbach and Sahn 2020; Miller and Curry 2013), since Black and Brown women have not had access to financial support from party elites (Francia et al., 2003; Hassell and Visalvanich, 2019). Furthermore, there are few Black and Brown women in public office, meaning that there are fewer mentorship opportunities even compared to White (Anglo) women, further eroding the ability of these candidates to access donor networks (Jensen and Martinek 2009; Sorensten and Chen 2022).

There is little reason to suggest that these same issues are not present in SCLR elections. Black and Brown women are underrepresented on state courts, despite being as ambitious as White Anglo women (Jensen and Martinek 2009), hindering the mentorship opportunities they can receive. Furthermore, based on our data, there are relatively few interest groups and political action committees geared specifically toward assisting Black and Brown candidates in getting onto SCLR, likely diminishing the donor networks Black and Brown women can access. Consequently, there is the possibility that the success women have had in SCLR elections—including fundraising —is driven by White Anglo women.

Hypothesis 6. Black and Hispanic women/Latinas will raise significantly less money than White (Anglo) women in SCLR elections.

Data and Methods

Our study uses an original data set. Our initial data on campaign contributions come from the National Institute for Money in Politics from 1989 to 2020. The Institute houses comprehensive, detailed reporting of the donations to all candidates in all years in which there were SCLR elections in a state. The Institute also indicates whether the donations are from an individual, non-individual (law firm, PAC, etc.), or "other" (i.e., unitemized donations). However, neither the Institute's data—nor the Bonica (2023) Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections that expands on these data—contain demographic data on the candidates (sex, prior professional experience, etc.). Consequently, we also use a combination of campaign websites, Ballotpedia, and newspaper articles to obtain demographic data on the candidates, such as sex and professional backgrounds. Because we are interested in the total amounts[7] raised by candidates, the final analysis aggregates the data by candidate and year. After cleaning, we have the campaign donation amounts, both individual and non-individual, for 1,149 candidates across 21 states.[8] All donation amounts are adjusted for inflation and reported in units of $100,000.

To test our hypotheses, we utilize a multilevel modeling (MLM) approach (Snijders and Bosker 2011; Steenbergen and Jones 2002). A simple structure of the error term in the multivariate regression analysis could be limited in capturing the multifaceted structure of our campaign contribution data for 1,149 candidates who are exclusively clustered into 21 states. However, ignoring the multilevel structure of the data would seriously violate regression assumptions while leading to incorrect standard errors (Gelman and Hill 2006; Snijders and Bosker 2011; Steenbergen and Jones 2002). We directly address the issue with two-level MLM with year-fixed effects. The first level is the state, and the second one is the candidate. Given the short temporal spans and intervals, we do not create a separate level for the year.

There are eleven dependent variables in our multilevel models. The first, number of small donations, measures the total number of donations of $200 or less to a candidate. The second, small donation percentage, measures what percentage of total donations to a candidate are $200 or less. Our third and fourth dependent variables measure the total number of donations greater than $200 and what percentage of total donations to a candidate are greater than $200, respectively. Our fifth dependent variable measures the total amount of campaign funds raised by a candidate.[9] Our sixth variable measures the (log-transformed) total amount raised from small donation sources. Our seventh variable measures the (log-transformed) total amount raised from large donation sources. The eighth variable measures the total number of contributions from those donors classified as individuals in the data. The ninth variable measures the (log-transformed) total amount raised from individual donors. The tenth variable measures the total number of contributions from those donors classified as non-individuals in the data, and the eleventh variable measures the (log-transformed) total amount raised from non-individual donors.

Our primary independent is the sex of the candidate (1 = female).[10] To test Hypothesis 6, we create separate dummy variables for whether the candidate was White (Anglo), Black, or Hispanic/Latine—the racial/ethnic groups most represented in our data. Additionally, we create separate interaction variables—one for Black women and one for Hispanic women and Latinas—to test whether women from marginalized communities are at a fundraising disadvantage compared to White Anglo women.

However, we must control for other factors. Partisan races are considered high-information races, both to voters (Converse 1962; Zaller 1992; etc.) and donors (Hall and Bonneau 2008; Rock and Baum 2010; Thomsen and Swers 2017). Consequently, candidates in partisan elections should see more contributions, and higher fundraising totals, regardless of sex. We code our variable "1" if the race was partisan, "0" otherwise.[11]

Another important factor in campaign fundraising is whether a candidate has prior judicial experience. Candidates who do not have prior experience (i.e., state trial judge) are less likely to be competitive—and less likely to attract donors—regardless of sex (Frederick and Streb 2011; Hall and Bonneau 2006; Streb and Frederick 2009). We code this variable as a dummy, with "1" indicating that the candidate was at least a state original jurisdiction judge prior to the election. Because we also theorize that well-qualified female SCLR candidates will do the best in SCLR elections, we create an interaction term between whether the candidate was a woman and whether they held at least a state trial judge seat prior to running for the SCLR seat.

We use a dummy variable for whether the candidate is an incumbent (1), as incumbents should raise more money regardless of sex. However, we are also interested in whether female incumbents do better than female non-incumbents. Therefore, we created an interaction variable between whether the candidate was a woman and whether they were the incumbent in that election. Separately, we control for whether the candidate was appointed by the governor or legislature prior to the election cycle (1), as appointments may improve the performance of women in campaign fundraising by building in incumbency (Holmes and Emrey 2006).

We also control for the contribution reporting requirements, as lower reporting thresholds (i.e., all

contributions to candidates must be itemized) may make donors wary of contributing, to avoid public scrutiny. Using the National Conference of State Legislatures website, we obtain the campaign contribution disclosure thresholds for each state and accordingly code each state in our data. We then create a variable for stringency, with a score of "1" representing states with higher threshold requirements (i.e., donations do not have to be itemized unless over $200) and a score of "4" representing states with lower threshold reporting requirements.

The type of SCLR seat at stake is another important factor in campaign contributions. As previously mentioned, incumbent-challenger races and multi-candidate races for open seats are likely to be the most competitive races, while retention and single-candidate races are likely the least competitive. If donors are strategic, they will focus their efforts on more competitive races, regardless of whether a woman is involved in those races. We create separate dummies for the most competitive of these races—chief justice, incumbent-challenger, and open seat—and we drop retention and non-competitive elections.

Additionally, we control for whether the SCLR election occurred in a presidential election year (1), as these races are likely to attract more donors since donor attention is heightened by other races. We also control for whether the seat was voted on by all voters in a state (1), as these races will have larger donor pools than district races. Finally, we expect there to be a correlation between the money raised by a candidate and whether they won their SCLR election. Consequently, we include a dummy for whether the candidate won their SCLR election (1). We are also interested in whether the effect of campaign contributions on winning one's election varies by sex, so we created an interaction effect between the election outcome and whether the SCLR candidate was a woman.

Analysis

Table 1 shows the MLM regression results, with log-transformed contribution amounts.[12] Our hypotheses are largely confirmed. Women draw significantly more donations from small and large donors, they outraise men regardless of donation types, and they outraise men in total amounts.[13] As also shown in Table 1, women receive significantly more donations from individual donation sources than men, but they outraise men regardless of whether the donations come from a non-individual. While we cannot draw conclusions on whether gender perceptions mean that women must work harder than men to achieve this advantage (e.g., Reid 2010), we can conclude that women are not at a fundraising disadvantage in SCLR elections, and they have this advantage primarily—but not exclusively—through small donations, particularly from individuals.

What these results do not tell us is **why** women are able to successfully outraise men. The most logical suggestion is the Jill Robinson Effect: as the number of women on SCLR has increased, the mentorship opportunities incumbent women can provide increase—including connecting new female candidates to donors. This theory is not supported by our findings regarding the interaction between incumbency, prior judicial experience, and sex. The percentage of small donations for female incumbents is significantly higher than for female challengers, and there are no significant differences between female incumbents and challengers in the total amounts raised. However, the percentages of total amounts raised by female incumbents across large and small donations are significantly **lower** than for incumbent women.

Another possibility is that the Jill Robinson Effect applies to which women decide to run: the Jill Robinson Effect could still be a valid explanation of the success women have in campaign contributions if only the "most qualified" women run. However, we find that holding a judgeship prior to running for an SCLR seat does not benefit women running for SCLR seats: these women raise **less** than those women who never held a judgeship prior to running for a seat.[14] As far as campaign contributions, we find that the Jill Robinson Effect does not explain why women do better than men at campaign fundraising.

The results also implicate the gendered electoral financing scheme: if women are outraising men on both large and small donations, then is it possible that women are not shut out of big-donor networks? To test this, we reran our model and examined specific types of non-individual donors: political parties, interest groups and political action committees, law firms, and labor unions. As show in Table 3, female SCLR candidates do not do significantly worse than men in fundraising from these sources, and women still outraise men.[15] Combined with our findings regarding individual donors, and the theoretical explanations for individual giving, we can conclude that the gendered electoral financing scheme does not affect women running for SCLR office.

However, the results do not explain why women do so well among individual donors. We theorized that investor donors view women as a good bet, despite their newness, because women are likely to be more qualified for SCLR office. The results regarding professional qualifications do not support this theory: women with prior judicial experience raise significantly less money from individual donor sources. What about the possibility that the female donor networks present in, for example, state legislative elections (e.g., Crespin and Deitz 2010) are present in SCLR elections? If these donor networks are present, then

Table 1. MLM Regression.

	(1)	(3)	(6)	(8)	(10)	(13)	(16)	(19)	(21)	(24)	(26)
	m1	m2	m3	m4	m5	m6	m7	m8	m9	m10	m11
Variables	small_num	small_p	large_num	large_p	lamount	lrsmallamount	lrlargeamount	individual_num	lrindi	nonindividual_num	lrnonindi
Was Candidate Female?	0.428**	−0.0450*	0.629***	0.0325	1.007***	1.075***	0.615***	0.454**	1.159***	0.363	0.759***
	(0.211)	(0.0249)	(0.230)	(0.0391)	(0.225)	(0.202)	(0.211)	(0.224)	(0.229)	(0.270)	(0.268)
Partisan Election?	0.0973	−0.0213	0.583***	0.0662**	0.726***	0.413***	0.698***	0.160	0.688***	1.009***	0.734***
	(0.275)	(0.0181)	(0.175)	(0.0284)	(0.155)	(0.140)	(0.148)	(0.226)	(0.150)	(0.206)	(0.184)
Presidential Election Yr?	0.645	−0.0494	0.911***	0.104	1.292*	0.358	1.650***	0.604	0.955	0.903***	2.746***
	(0.445)	(0.0770)	(0.141)	(0.163)	(0.673)	(0.809)	(0.630)	(0.372)	(0.931)	(0.300)	(0.762)
Incumbent?	0.534***	−0.0588***	1.007***	0.0380	1.732***	1.154***	1.447***	0.717***	1.546***	1.055***	1.490***
	(0.186)	(0.0215)	(0.145)	(0.0432)	(0.194)	(0.167)	(0.182)	(0.148)	(0.194)	(0.208)	(0.212)
Judge Prior to Election?	0.568***	−0.0732***	0.862***	0.0612*	1.465***	1.103***	1.161***	0.623***	1.361***	0.952***	1.021***
	(0.113)	(0.0160)	(0.112)	(0.0314)	(0.144)	(0.126)	(0.136)	(0.0911)	(0.144)	(0.163)	(0.163)
Appointed to SCLR?	0.216	−0.0243	0.302***	0.0198	0.458**	0.431***	0.435**	0.252**	0.505***	0.168*	0.427**
	(0.144)	(0.0212)	(0.0920)	(0.0255)	(0.191)	(0.164)	(0.177)	(0.113)	(0.190)	(0.0973)	(0.199)
Black	−0.151	−0.00453	−0.303**	0.00834	−0.163	0.0585	−0.230	−0.178	−0.0927	−0.225	−0.0419
	(0.177)	(0.0256)	(0.135)	(0.0180)	(0.231)	(0.199)	(0.214)	(0.135)	(0.230)	(0.178)	(0.249)
Hispanic	0.618**	0.0739	−0.114	−0.0913**	0.0680	0.686*	0.185	0.254	0.186	0.0942	−0.425
	(0.255)	(0.0451)	(0.213)	(0.0460)	(0.407)	(0.359)	(0.389)	(0.247)	(0.405)	(0.258)	(0.434)
Chief Justice Election?	0.941**	0.00296	0.578***	0.0210	0.468*	0.353	0.545**	0.613**	0.364	0.552**	0.208
	(0.379)	(0.0288)	(0.183)	(0.0318)	(0.259)	(0.222)	(0.243)	(0.279)	(0.259)	(0.252)	(0.276)
Incumbent-Challenger Election?	0.0667	−0.00623	0.114	0.00346	0.337**	0.155	0.355***	−0.0170	0.200	0.359***	0.341**
	(0.175)	(0.0147)	(0.126)	(0.0194)	(0.132)	(0.115)	(0.124)	(0.154)	(0.131)	(0.136)	(0.145)
Statewide Race?	−0.381	−0.0655	0.109	0.0286	0.308	−0.436	0.372	−0.122	0.319	0.215	0.144
	(0.433)	(0.0555)	(0.231)	(0.0466)	(0.314)	(0.350)	(0.338)	(0.374)	(0.267)	(0.232)	(0.604)
Did Candidate Win?	0.640***	−0.0427***	0.750***	0.0375**	1.138***	0.884***	1.059***	0.684***	1.033***	0.864***	1.015***
	(0.0979)	(0.0158)	(0.0992)	(0.0164)	(0.143)	(0.123)	(0.132)	(0.0869)	(0.143)	(0.117)	(0.150)
Campaign Finance Stringency	0.819***	0.0352	0.155	−0.0489***	0.225*	0.584***	0.189	0.574***	0.319***	−0.117	−0.0261
	(0.170)	(0.0229)	(0.100)	(0.0189)	(0.127)	(0.143)	(0.138)	(0.145)	(0.109)	(0.136)	(0.254)
female_X_black	−0.0330	0.0719*	0.0324	−0.0671	−0.655*	−0.352	−0.485	−0.0452	−0.791**	−0.185	−0.829**
	(0.427)	(0.0418)	(0.300)	(0.0465)	(0.377)	(0.325)	(0.352)	(0.355)	(0.375)	(0.277)	(0.402)
female_X_hispanic	−1.540***	−0.136*	−0.151	0.143**	0.584	−0.789	0.183	−1.049***	0.128	0.280	0.594
	(0.305)	(0.0721)	(0.286)	(0.0612)	(0.651)	(0.562)	(0.611)	(0.345)	(0.647)	(0.261)	(0.680)
female_X_incumbent	0.0145	0.0740*	−0.549**	−0.0728	−1.110***	−0.807***	−0.853***	−0.253	−1.177***	−0.270	−1.065***
	(0.342)	(0.0378)	(0.279)	(0.0557)	(0.341)	(0.295)	(0.317)	(0.326)	(0.341)	(0.342)	(0.369)
female_X_priorjudge	−0.297	0.0386	−0.562**	−0.0193	−0.825***	−0.809***	−0.455*	−0.352	−0.952***	−0.291	−0.594*
	(0.270)	(0.0306)	(0.231)	(0.0467)	(0.276)	(0.242)	(0.257)	(0.267)	(0.279)	(0.231)	(0.310)

(continued)

Table 1. (continued)

	(1)	(3)	(6)	(8)	(10)	(13)	(16)	(19)	(21)	(24)	(26)
	m1	m2	m3	m4	m5	m6	m7	m8	m9	m10	m11
Variables	small_num	small_p	large_num	large_p	lamount	lrsmallamount	lrlargeamount	individual_num	lrindi	nonindividual_num	lrnonindi
female_X_outcome	0.0790	0.0163	−0.177	−0.0277	−0.146	−0.237	−0.0421	0.0463	−0.255	−0.194	−0.0333
	(0.197)	(0.0296)	(0.126)	(0.0302)	(0.267)	(0.229)	(0.247)	(0.139)	(0.267)	(0.179)	(0.280)
Observations	1,034	1,033	1,034	1,033	1,032	995	1,009	1,034	1,015	1,034	918
Number of groups		21			21	21	21		21		21

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, and *$p < 0.1$.

Table 2. Mixed Regression.

Variables	Amounts Raised from Individuals	Amounts Raised Individuals w/Interaction Effects	Amounts Raised from Non-individuals	Amounts Raised Non-individuals w/Interaction Effects
Was Candidate Female?	60.93*	135.6**	−17.46	−61.77
	(33.33)	(66.85)	(48.83)	(97.99)
Partisan Election?	122.9***	125.3***	119.3*	118.3*
	(47.41)	(47.39)	(69.82)	(69.85)
Presidential Election Yr?	976.2***	968.1***	807.2***	803.5***
	(204.0)	(203.9)	(299.7)	(299.9)
Incumbent?	177.9***	209.3***	123.6	142.3*
	(51.31)	(58.04)	(75.17)	(85.09)
Judge Prior to Election?	81.02**	109.3**	146.1***	133.6**
	(37.82)	(43.02)	(55.42)	(63.08)
Appointed to SCLR?	143.7**	141.6**	94.60	94.29
	(56.87)	(57.08)	(83.32)	(83.69)
Black	−142.2***	−149.2**	−203.0**	−173.2*
	(54.37)	(69.10)	(79.64)	(101.3)
Hispanic	−15.89	45.43	−29.81	−48.24
	(96.68)	(121.7)	(141.6)	(178.4)
Chief Justice Election?	156.1**	153.1**	338.2***	336.7***
	(77.56)	(77.52)	(113.6)	(113.7)
Incumbent-Challenger Election?	18.49	15.90	101.8*	101.5*
	(39.49)	(39.49)	(57.90)	(57.95)
Statewide Race?	−32.89	−32.24	−27.94	−26.06
	(111.1)	(111.1)	(170.0)	(170.3)
Did Candidate Win?	228.0***	217.6***	365.3***	332.5***
	(35.86)	(42.64)	(52.53)	(62.51)
Campaign Finance Stringency	127.6***	127.5***	1.802	−0.0755
	(45.17)	(45.18)	(69.21)	(69.31)
female_X_black		25.61		−74.94
		(112.8)		(165.3)
female_X_hispanic		−149.7		51.37
		(194.6)		(285.2)
female_X_incumbent		−113.7		47.16
		(82.35)		(120.7)
female_X_priorjudge		−126.2		−61.65
		(101.8)		(149.2)
female_X_outcome		35.24		109.8
		(79.86)		(117.1)
Observations	1,034	1,034	1,034	1,034
Number of groups	21	21	21	21

Standard errors in parentheses.
***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, and *$p < 0.1$.

this would explain why women are able to outraise men among individual donors. Unfortunately, our data set lacks information regarding the sex of donors, which means we must relegate a formal evaluation of this theory to future research.

There is also the paradox that incumbent women do worse than non-incumbent women in campaign fundraising. One possible explanation is the idea that name recognition via incumbency means that female incumbents believe they do not have to fundraise as much as they did when they were challengers. However, this explanation belies our results, which show that incumbents, regardless of sex, not only raise significantly more money than challengers but also raise significantly more from parties and interest groups. Another possible explanation is that women are more likely than men to face challengers in subsequent elections (e.g., Lawless and Pearson 2008), thereby increasing the portion of campaign contributions given to challengers. There is also the possibility that the quality of female incumbents is evaluated differently by

Table 3. MLM With Non-individual Groups.

	(1)	(3)	(6)	(8)	(10)	(13)	(16)	(19)	(22)	(25)	(28)
	m1	m2	m3	m4	m5	m6	m7	m8	m9	m10	m11
Variables	small_num	small_p	large_num	large_p	lamount	lrsmallamount	lrlargeamount	lrpartyamount	lrpacinterestmoneyamount	lrlawyermoney	lrunionmoney
Was Candidate Female?	0.428**	−0.0450*	0.629***	0.0325	1.007***	1.075***	0.615***	−0.145	0.0778	0.404	0.255
	(0.211)	(0.0249)	(0.230)	(0.0391)	(0.225)	(0.202)	(0.211)	(0.478)	(0.315)	(0.290)	(0.395)
Partisan election?	0.0973	−0.0213	0.583***	0.0662**	0.726***	0.413***	0.698***	1.844***	0.755***	−0.347	0.513**
	(0.275)	(0.0181)	(0.175)	(0.0284)	(0.155)	(0.140)	(0.148)	(0.390)	(0.222)	(0.215)	(0.261)
Presidential Election Yr?	0.645	−0.0494	0.911***	0.104	1.292*	0.358	1.650***	4.941**	0.444	0.733	−1.305
	(0.445)	(0.0770)	(0.141)	(0.163)	(0.673)	(0.809)	(0.630)	(2.109)	(1.664)	(1.171)	(1.702)
Incumbent?	0.534***	−0.0588***	1.007***	0.0380	1.732***	1.154***	1.447***	0.638*	0.912***	0.962***	−0.227
	(0.186)	(0.0215)	(0.145)	(0.0432)	(0.194)	(0.167)	(0.182)	(0.349)	(0.235)	(0.214)	(0.305)
Judge Prior to Election?	0.568***	−0.0732***	0.862***	0.0612*	1.465***	1.103***	1.161***	0.373	0.300	0.840***	0.234
	(0.113)	(0.0160)	(0.112)	(0.0314)	(0.144)	(0.126)	(0.136)	(0.289)	(0.197)	(0.176)	(0.249)
Appointed to SCLR?	0.216	−0.0243	0.302***	0.0198	0.458**	0.431***	0.435**	0.475	0.252	0.366*	−0.166
	(0.144)	(0.0212)	(0.0920)	(0.0255)	(0.191)	(0.164)	(0.177)	(0.316)	(0.209)	(0.189)	(0.259)
Black	−0.151	−0.00453	−0.303**	0.00834	−0.163	0.0585	−0.230	0.215	−0.679**	0.0833	0.0261
	(0.177)	(0.0256)	(0.135)	(0.0180)	(0.231)	(0.199)	(0.214)	(0.396)	(0.280)	(0.238)	(0.315)
Hispanic	0.618**	0.0739	−0.114	−0.0913**	0.0680	0.686*	0.185	−0.713	−0.0945	0.721	1.002*
	(0.255)	(0.0451)	(0.213)	(0.0460)	(0.407)	(0.359)	(0.389)	(0.752)	(0.483)	(0.455)	(0.598)
Chief Justice Election?	0.941**	0.00296	0.578***	0.0210	0.468*	0.353	0.545**	0.621	0.333	−0.217	0.428
	(0.379)	(0.0288)	(0.183)	(0.0318)	(0.259)	(0.222)	(0.243)	(0.423)	(0.296)	(0.262)	(0.389)
Incumbent-Challenger Election?	0.0667	−0.00623	0.114	0.00346	0.337**	0.155	0.355***	0.300	0.470***	0.0607	−0.125
	(0.175)	(0.0147)	(0.126)	(0.0194)	(0.132)	(0.115)	(0.124)	(0.252)	(0.166)	(0.150)	(0.205)
Statewide Election?	−0.381	−0.0655	0.109	0.0286	0.308	−0.436	0.372	−0.544	0.199	−0.314	−0.0409
	(0.433)	(0.0555)	(0.231)	(0.0466)	(0.314)	(0.350)	(0.338)	(0.635)	(0.632)	(0.779)	(0.445)
Did Candidate Win?	0.640***	−0.0427***	0.750***	0.0375**	1.138***	0.884***	1.059***	0.476**	1.059***	0.850***	−0.0583
	(0.0979)	(0.0158)	(0.0992)	(0.0164)	(0.143)	(0.123)	(0.132)	(0.237)	(0.160)	(0.149)	(0.212)
Campaign Finance Stringency	0.819***	0.0352	0.155	−0.0489***	0.225*	0.584***	0.189	−0.0881	0.142	−0.294	0.137
	(0.170)	(0.0229)	(0.100)	(0.0189)	(0.127)	(0.143)	(0.138)	(0.268)	(0.272)	(0.357)	(0.189)
female_X_black	−0.0330	0.0719*	0.0324	−0.0671	−0.655*	−0.352	−0.485	−0.922	−0.395	−0.573	−0.227
	(0.427)	(0.0418)	(0.300)	(0.0465)	(0.377)	(0.325)	(0.352)	(0.674)	(0.481)	(0.392)	(0.518)
female_X_hispanic	−1.540***	−0.136*	−0.151	0.143**	0.584	−0.789	0.183	0.846	−0.801	−0.736	−1.820**
	(0.305)	(0.0721)	(0.286)	(0.0612)	(0.651)	(0.562)	(0.611)	(1.058)	(0.757)	(0.663)	(0.853)
female_X_incumbent	0.0145	0.0740*	−0.549**	−0.0728	−1.110***	−0.807***	−0.853***	−0.104	−0.219	−0.421	−0.0950
	(0.342)	(0.0378)	(0.279)	(0.0557)	(0.341)	(0.295)	(0.317)	(0.601)	(0.401)	(0.367)	(0.484)
female_X_priorjudge	−0.297	0.0386	−0.562**	−0.0193	−0.825***	−0.809***	−0.455*	0.579	−0.343	−0.231	−0.129
	(0.270)	(0.0306)	(0.231)	(0.0467)	(0.276)	(0.242)	(0.257)	(0.525)	(0.354)	(0.321)	(0.427)
female_X_outcome	0.0790	0.0163	−0.177	−0.0277	−0.146	−0.237	−0.0421	−0.0119	0.0308	−0.211	0.338
	(0.197)	(0.0296)	(0.126)	(0.0302)	(0.267)	(0.229)	(0.247)	(0.438)	(0.298)	(0.274)	(0.364)
Observations	1,034	1,033	1,034	1,033	1,032	995	1,009	512	719	763	524
Number of groups		21			21	21	21	20	21	21	21

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, and *$p < 0.1$.

Table 4. MLM Regression—No States With Small Black Population.

	(1)	(3)	(6)	(8)	(10)	(13)	(16)	(19)	(21)	(24)	(26)
	m1	m2	m3	m4	m5	m6	m7	m8	m9	m10	m11
Variables	small_num	small_p	large_num	large_p	lamount	lrsmallamount	lrlargeamount	individual_num	lrindi	nonindividual_num	lrnonindi
Was Candidate Female?	0.444	−0.0570**	0.563*	0.0904***	1.044***	1.065***	0.771***	0.376	1.141***	0.227	0.848**
	(0.291)	(0.0287)	(0.313)	(0.0254)	(0.283)	(0.259)	(0.264)	(0.284)	(0.292)	(0.325)	(0.341)
Partisan Election?	0.752**	0.00572	0.264	0.0226	0.525**	0.164	0.636***	0.300	0.252	0.598***	0.855***
	(0.317)	(0.0226)	(0.176)	(0.0216)	(0.216)	(0.226)	(0.189)	(0.283)	(0.211)	(0.183)	(0.294)
Presidential Election Yr?	1.610***	0.106	1.024***	−0.0741***	0.996	−0.468	1.020	1.213***	0.0530	0.947***	0.727
	(0.346)	(0.0790)	(0.175)	(0.0284)	(0.762)	(1.384)	(0.687)	(0.274)	(1.533)	(0.205)	(1.051)
Incumbent?	0.543**	−0.0918***	1.070***	0.0948**	1.957***	1.234***	1.714***	0.721***	1.702***	1.116***	1.825***
	(0.251)	(0.0242)	(0.225)	(0.0421)	(0.239)	(0.208)	(0.223)	(0.193)	(0.242)	(0.260)	(0.262)
Judge Prior to Election?	0.940***	−0.0961***	0.944***	0.0903***	1.795***	1.338***	1.538***	0.780***	1.634***	1.040***	1.511***
	(0.134)	(0.0174)	(0.179)	(0.0301)	(0.172)	(0.153)	(0.163)	(0.118)	(0.174)	(0.193)	(0.198)
Appointed to SCLR?	0.157	−0.0236	0.380***	0.0211	0.481**	0.537***	0.484**	0.270***	0.573**	0.262***	0.536**
	(0.107)	(0.0233)	(0.0838)	(0.0132)	(0.230)	(0.200)	(0.213)	(0.102)	(0.230)	(0.0907)	(0.243)
Black	0.00706	0.00351	−0.181	−0.0149	−0.0152	0.329	−0.107	−0.0188	0.0550	−0.0991	−0.0333
	(0.205)	(0.0255)	(0.150)	(0.0121)	(0.252)	(0.219)	(0.234)	(0.143)	(0.253)	(0.193)	(0.268)
Hispanic	0.0338	0.103**	−0.437*	−0.111*	−0.524	0.267	−0.310	−0.247	−0.356	−0.234	−1.201**
	(0.351)	(0.0502)	(0.261)	(0.0606)	(0.495)	(0.448)	(0.483)	(0.285)	(0.496)	(0.290)	(0.550)
Chief Justice Election?	0.637**	0.0163	0.477***	−0.00804	0.346	0.276	0.470**	0.413	0.215	0.276	0.129
	(0.283)	(0.0256)	(0.161)	(0.0239)	(0.252)	(0.220)	(0.236)	(0.252)	(0.254)	(0.246)	(0.276)
Incumbent-Challenger Election?	−0.0275	0.0140	0.0911	−0.0134	0.154	0.0312	0.203	−0.168	−0.0339	0.319***	0.246
	(0.203)	(0.0161)	(0.139)	(0.0201)	(0.157)	(0.143)	(0.145)	(0.195)	(0.158)	(0.114)	(0.179)
Statewide Race?	−1.255***	−0.0538*	−0.0470	0.0578	−0.0581	−0.986**	−0.0170	−0.582	0.0544	−0.0298	−0.208
	(0.450)	(0.0304)	(0.146)	(0.0378)	(0.273)	(0.413)	(0.222)	(0.434)	(0.255)	(0.214)	(0.587)
Did Candidate Win?	0.820***	−0.0358**	0.771***	0.0365***	1.233***	0.868***	1.152***	0.807***	1.026***	0.893***	1.156***
	(0.116)	(0.0169)	(0.128)	(0.0106)	(0.166)	(0.145)	(0.155)	(0.104)	(0.168)	(0.146)	(0.177)
Campaign Finance Stringency	0.554***	0.0540***	0.0501	−0.0564***	−0.106	0.519***	−0.157*	0.331**	0.162	−0.179	−0.412
	(0.153)	(0.0130)	(0.0529)	(0.0165)	(0.116)	(0.183)	(0.0929)	(0.159)	(0.108)	(0.154)	(0.264)
female_X_black	0.0561	0.0747*	−0.141	−0.0770*	−0.902**	−0.509	−0.724*	−0.0998	−1.015**	−0.513*	−0.848**
	(0.414)	(0.0404)	(0.307)	(0.0453)	(0.399)	(0.348)	(0.374)	(0.367)	(0.401)	(0.266)	(0.430)
female_X_hispanic	−1.137***	−0.173**	0.142	0.177**	1.109	−0.427	0.631	−0.633**	0.509	0.421	1.505*
	(0.346)	(0.0725)	(0.220)	(0.0716)	(0.716)	(0.632)	(0.681)	(0.313)	(0.718)	(0.266)	(0.776)
female_X_incumbent	0.169	0.0792*	−0.375	−0.132***	−0.938**	−0.798**	−0.747*	−0.0982	−0.974**	0.0125	−1.067**
	(0.464)	(0.0417)	(0.358)	(0.0374)	(0.412)	(0.362)	(0.384)	(0.415)	(0.417)	(0.341)	(0.455)
female_X_priorjudge	−0.514	0.0589*	−0.643**	−0.0885***	−0.957***	−0.933***	−0.724**	−0.447	−1.038***	−0.193	−0.899**
	(0.364)	(0.0333)	(0.304)	(0.0275)	(0.329)	(0.294)	(0.307)	(0.333)	(0.336)	(0.266)	(0.378)

(continued)

Table 4. (continued)

	(1)	(3)	(6)	(8)	(10)	(13)	(16)	(19)	(21)	(24)	(26)
	m1	m2	m3	m4	m5	m6	m7	m8	m9	m10	m11
Variables	small_num	small_p	large_num	large_p	lamount	lrsmallamount	lrlargeamount	individual_num	lrindi	nonindividual_num	lrnonindi
female_X_outcome	0.0629	0.00518	0.0154	0.0180	−0.104	−0.0801	0.0145	0.143	−0.147	−0.107	0.0929
	(0.214)	(0.0309)	(0.148)	(0.0247)	(0.304)	(0.264)	(0.282)	(0.156)	(0.307)	(0.206)	(0.324)
Observations	706	705	706	705	704	679	693	706	691	706	648
Number of groups		12			12	12	12		12		12

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, and *$p < 0.1$.

Table 5. Mixed Regression—No States With Small Black Population.

Variables	Amounts Raised from Individuals	Amounts Raised Individuals w/Interaction Effects	Amounts Raised from Non-individuals	Amounts Raised Non-individuals w/Interaction Effects
Was Candidate Female?	72.25*	150.5*	3.957	−45.53
	(40.66)	(87.44)	(67.85)	(146.5)
Partisan Election?	35.73	41.09	291.0**	288.6**
	(69.87)	(69.10)	(123.9)	(124.4)
Presidential Election Yr?	550.7**	512.5**	599.6	593.9
	(243.8)	(242.0)	(429.0)	(430.9)
Incumbent?	212.9***	213.4***	234.4**	228.8*
	(65.59)	(74.50)	(109.5)	(124.8)
Judge Prior to Election?	99.80**	157.5***	234.8***	237.0***
	(46.56)	(53.62)	(77.80)	(89.93)
Appointed to SCLR?	233.6***	222.2***	168.2	163.5
	(71.60)	(71.77)	(119.5)	(120.3)
Black	−127.9**	−138.1*	−243.7**	−227.0*
	(60.46)	(78.76)	(100.9)	(131.9)
Hispanic	−57.79	−22.48	−36.64	−108.4
	(114.6)	(154.7)	(191.4)	(259.1)
Chief Justice Election?	132.8*	138.6*	346.3***	348.9***
	(79.17)	(78.87)	(132.5)	(132.6)
Incumbent-Challenger Election?	−9.374	−8.215	150.0*	152.3*
	(49.53)	(49.37)	(83.70)	(83.93)
Statewide Race?	−40.09	−49.34	−97.95	−101.1
	(93.65)	(91.20)	(189.5)	(191.1)
Did Candidate Win?	286.4***	278.0***	502.0***	476.2***
	(43.31)	(52.01)	(72.27)	(87.10)
Campaign Finance Stringency	68.24*	65.52*	−151.6*	−153.1*
	(40.13)	(39.00)	(82.20)	(82.91)
female_X_black		77.15		−11.14
		(124.7)		(208.7)
female_X_hispanic		−42.91		165.8
		(223.6)		(374.5)
female_X_incumbent		−197.6*		0.246
		(102.0)		(170.8)
female_X_priorjudge		0.374		37.12
		(128.3)		(215.0)
female_X_outcome		34.08		85.80
		(95.04)		(159.1)
Observations	706	706	706	706
Number of groups	12	12	12	12

Standard errors in parentheses.
***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, and *$p < 0.1$.

donors than their male counterparts, just as female incumbents are evaluated differently by voters than their male counterparts (e.g., Fulton 2012), thereby depressing contributions to female incumbents. A simpler explanation is that women are more likely to be challengers in our data set then incumbents: 60 percent of female SCLR candidates in our data set were not incumbents. With more data for incumbent women, researchers can better determine whether the finding regarding sex and incumbency holds, and whether the finding in this article is the result of a low N or the consequence of the theoretical explanations mentioned above.

Regarding race/ethnicity and sex, as shown in Table 1, Black women raise significantly less money from individual and non-individual donor sources compared to their White Anglo counterparts. Black women also raise less money overall than White Anglo women, but—contrary to what we expected, given the literature—this significance is weak. Furthermore, there are no significant differences between Black and African American women

and their White counterparts in the total amounts raised from large and small donation sources. In other words, while Black women are at a fundraising disadvantage to White women, it is not as pronounced in SCLR elections as it is in other elections. However, our data also contain states with small Black and African American populations, such as Montana and Wisconsin, so we decided to run a separate model that excludes those states whose total population of African Americans is less than ten percent (as of 2020). As shown in Tables 4 and 5, the results are more in line with the extant literature: Black women raise significantly less money overall than their White counterparts, and the statistical significance is now at the 0.05 level, and Black women now significantly receive less money from large donors than in the main model. Since the other findings remain similar, we can conclude that Black and African American women are at a significant fundraising disadvantage to White women.

Also interesting in the main model is how the disadvantage Black women have in fundraising is not as prevalent with Hispanic women and Latinas. Although Hispanic women and Latinas receive significantly fewer small donations—and donations from individuals—than their White Anglo counterparts, a greater percentage of the donations to Hispanic women and Latinas come from large donors, which likely explains why there is no significant difference with White Anglo women in total amounts raised. Additionally, Hispanic women and Latinas have a significantly higher percentage of their total donations come from large donor sources, suggesting that the reason Hispanic women and Latinas have a significantly smaller percentage of their donations coming from small donations is because these women can rely more on large donations to achieve parity with White Anglo women. However, our data also contain states with small Hispanic and Latino populations, such as Alabama and Louisiana, so we ran a separate model that excludes those states whose total population of Hispanics and Latine is less than ten percent (as of 2020). As shown in Tables 6 and 7, the results do not change substantially.

The fact that there are differences in how Black women and Hispanic women/Latinas are impacted by campaign finance is very interesting. The question is why these groups have different experiences, especially since female Hispanic and Latina donors are less likely than other women to contribute to women's campaigns (Grumbach et al. 2022)? Unfortunately, there is a dearth of literature on campaign contributions to Hispanic women and Latinas in US elections, and (to our knowledge) no one has examined this question in the context of SCLR elections. There is also the possibility that these results are driven by small Ns: only 34 of the candidates (3.1 percent) in our data identify as Black or African American women, and only 10 (less than 1 percent) identify as Hispanic women or Latinas. Whether there is a theoretical reason for fundraising differences between these groups, or whether the differences we find are simply the product of a small population of candidates, must await future research.

Conclusion and Future Research

This study is the first of its kind: a comprehensive, multilevel analysis of differences between men and women in campaign contributions in State Court of Last Resort elections, across an extensive period. We find that women do raise more than men, and they do so by relying primarily, but not exclusively, on small donations, particularly from individuals. We also have initial evidence that this fundraising advantage is driven by White (Anglo) women, although the degree of difference varies between Black and Brown women. However, in contrast to previous studies, we find that female incumbents, and women with prior experiences as judges, are at a fundraising disadvantage to their male counterparts.

Despite the unique nature of this study, there remain important questions. One is the relationship between candidate and donor sex and giving to which candidates. The consensus of the literature is that women primarily give to other women, and the rise of women's groups in other elections may mean that female candidates do well with women donors and groups seemingly oriented toward women's electoral success. Unfortunately, our data are limited in testing these theories. We lack accurate data on whether the individual donor is a man or a woman. While we do have data on women-focused groups, the number of groups identifiable as such is small: 89 percent of the candidates in our data received two or fewer donations from women's groups. Without values for the sex of the donors, we cannot accurately assess whether female donors primarily give to female candidates. Future editions of this data will search for ways to identify the sex of the donor, and if we are successful, we can test whether women do give primarily to women in SCLR elections.

Another area of future research is examining the relationship between sex, campaign contributions, and the margin of victory in SCLR elections. Reid (2004) and Nguyen (2019) find that female candidates are more likely to win the more donations they receive, although Reid (2004) finds that the margin of victory does not correlate with the donations received. Other studies (e.g., Gill and Eugenis 2019) find that—even when women outraise men—the donation advantage does not explain why women win state court elections, and the null findings for our interaction between women and whether they won their SCLR election lend some support for this view. As our data set provides a more comprehensive picture of the fundraising landscape, and our results suggest (white) women do well at raising money, the next step is to take

Table 6. MLM Regression—No States With Small Hispanic/Latine Populations.

	(1)	(3)	(6)	(8)	(10)	(13)	(16)	(19)	(21)	(24)	(26)
	m1	m2	m3	m4	m5	m6	m7	m8	m9	m10	m11
Variables	small_num	small_p	large_num	large_p	lamount	lrsmallamount	lrlargeamount	individual_num	lrindi	nonindividual_num	lrnonindi
Was Candidate Female?	0.763***	−0.0358	0.789***	0.0630	1.235***	1.111***	0.908***	0.763***	1.319***	0.579**	0.978**
	(0.199)	(0.0408)	(0.212)	(0.0599)	(0.345)	(0.298)	(0.313)	(0.193)	(0.346)	(0.283)	(0.400)
Partisan Election?	−0.163	−0.0218	0.613***	0.0602*	0.756***	0.298	0.720***	0.0337	0.680***	0.740***	0.614**
	(0.251)	(0.0311)	(0.171)	(0.0321)	(0.230)	(0.211)	(0.222)	(0.187)	(0.220)	(0.156)	(0.274)
Presidential Election Yr?	0.834***	0.201	1.041***	−0.1000	0.564	−0.307	0.338	0.832***	−0.0883	0.365	−0.466
	(0.284)	(0.169)	(0.160)	(0.0695)	(0.921)	(1.545)	(0.928)	(0.170)	(1.730)	(0.450)	(1.315)
Incumbent?	0.612***	−0.0358	1.098***	0.0199	1.816***	1.316***	1.370***	0.770***	1.530***	1.189***	1.474***
	(0.169)	(0.0372)	(0.218)	(0.0806)	(0.314)	(0.261)	(0.284)	(0.143)	(0.306)	(0.317)	(0.328)
Judge Prior to Election?	0.571***	−0.0776***	0.982***	0.0846*	1.643***	1.182***	1.228***	0.680***	1.617***	0.856***	0.847***
	(0.123)	(0.0276)	(0.209)	(0.0481)	(0.232)	(0.197)	(0.211)	(0.151)	(0.228)	(0.332)	(0.256)
Appointed to SCLR?	0.329**	−0.0678*	0.560***	0.0719	0.704**	0.604**	0.686**	0.343***	0.745**	0.392***	0.702**
	(0.137)	(0.0373)	(0.110)	(0.0610)	(0.313)	(0.258)	(0.280)	(0.0768)	(0.304)	(0.148)	(0.314)
Black	−0.211	−0.0170	−0.0631	0.0453	−0.0307	0.270	−0.0589	−0.130	0.0840	−0.184	−0.00577
	(0.287)	(0.0456)	(0.284)	(0.0371)	(0.385)	(0.321)	(0.342)	(0.267)	(0.374)	(0.236)	(0.384)
Hispanic	0.549**	0.101*	−0.135	−0.105*	−0.186	0.748*	0.0112	0.303	−0.0594	−0.124	−0.607
	(0.221)	(0.0588)	(0.250)	(0.0564)	(0.497)	(0.423)	(0.458)	(0.234)	(0.483)	(0.256)	(0.508)
Chief Justice Election?	−0.134	−0.0231	0.282	0.0494	−0.294	−0.355	−0.0322	−0.133	−0.525	−0.109	−0.197
	(0.261)	(0.0565)	(0.404)	(0.0878)	(0.477)	(0.392)	(0.437)	(0.305)	(0.464)	(0.317)	(0.505)
Incumbent-Challenger Election?	0.143	−0.0104	0.231	0.0339	0.432**	0.423**	0.350*	0.103	0.190	0.263	0.514**
	(0.226)	(0.0248)	(0.179)	(0.0450)	(0.207)	(0.174)	(0.189)	(0.180)	(0.202)	(0.218)	(0.222)
Statewide Race?	0.294	−0.0407	0.206	−0.0109	0.489	0.361	0.530	0.290	0.299	0.465***	0.814
	(0.229)	(0.105)	(0.219)	(0.0567)	(0.369)	(0.470)	(0.464)	(0.209)	(0.341)	(0.166)	(0.749)
Did Candidate Win?	0.791***	−0.0675**	0.986***	0.0630***	1.400***	0.948***	1.314***	0.834***	1.230***	1.154***	1.313***
	(0.133)	(0.0275)	(0.147)	(0.0215)	(0.232)	(0.193)	(0.206)	(0.133)	(0.228)	(0.143)	(0.231)
Campaign Finance Stringency	0.726***	0.0404	0.164	−0.0546*	0.140	0.511***	0.0533	0.545***	0.274*	−0.274	−0.501*
	(0.117)	(0.0425)	(0.118)	(0.0284)	(0.157)	(0.193)	(0.192)	(0.0904)	(0.147)	(0.257)	(0.305)
female_X_black	1.079***	0.140*	0.350	−0.154*	−0.609	−0.146	−0.344	0.633**	−0.553	−0.110	−0.751
	(0.378)	(0.0734)	(0.287)	(0.0843)	(0.620)	(0.512)	(0.560)	(0.287)	(0.604)	(0.296)	(0.625)
female_X_hispanic	−1.022***	−0.172*	0.134	0.175***	0.872	−0.856	0.393	−0.647**	0.296	0.641***	0.871
	(0.260)	(0.0908)	(0.212)	(0.0607)	(0.766)	(0.639)	(0.692)	(0.281)	(0.745)	(0.231)	(0.768)
female_X_incumbent	−0.567***	0.0639	−0.806***	−0.0626	−1.361**	−0.867*	−1.093**	−0.606***	−1.300**	−0.639**	−1.307**
	(0.151)	(0.0654)	(0.195)	(0.101)	(0.552)	(0.457)	(0.492)	(0.116)	(0.539)	(0.308)	(0.564)
female_X_priorjudge	−0.596***	0.0350	−0.635**	−0.0476	−0.856**	−0.710*	−0.538	−0.654***	−0.888**	−0.163	−0.498
	(0.199)	(0.0511)	(0.249)	(0.0886)	(0.432)	(0.365)	(0.387)	(0.201)	(0.428)	(0.338)	(0.466)

(continued)

Table 6. (continued)

	(1)	(3)	(6)	(8)	(10)	(13)	(16)	(19)	(21)	(24)	(26)
	m1	m2	m3	m4	m5	m6	m7	m8	m9	m10	m11
Variables	small_num	small_p	large_num	large_p	lamount	lrsmallamount	lrlargeamount	individual_num	lrindi	nonindividual_num	lrnonindi
female_X_outcome	−0.342	0.0512	−0.483**	−0.0860	−0.531	−0.468	−0.515	−0.360*	−0.544	−0.431**	−0.555
	(0.222)	(0.0532)	(0.239)	(0.0671)	(0.449)	(0.372)	(0.398)	(0.204)	(0.440)	(0.196)	(0.450)
Observations	510	510	510	510	509	488	490	510	497	510	440
Number of groups		11			11	11	11		11		11

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, and *$p < 0.1$.

Table 7. Mixed Regression—No States With Small Hispanic/Latine Populations.

Variables	Amounts Raised from Individuals	Amounts Raised Individuals w/Interaction Effects	Amounts Raised from Non-individuals	Amounts Raised Non-individuals w/Interaction Effects
Was Candidate Female?	34.33	105.8	−89.50	−40.39
	(45.60)	(83.91)	(64.45)	(119.9)
Partisan Election?	85.89	87.59	126.6	133.5
	(58.48)	(57.74)	(84.30)	(84.33)
Presidential Election Yr?	541.1***	532.6***	838.4***	833.7***
	(143.6)	(142.0)	(203.2)	(203.0)
Incumbent?	131.6*	149.0*	160.2*	167.4
	(67.86)	(76.84)	(95.91)	(109.8)
Judge Prior to Election?	87.20*	107.1*	85.84	93.40
	(51.35)	(58.72)	(72.68)	(84.03)
Appointed to SCLR?	261.0***	255.2***	122.5	136.9
	(74.46)	(75.40)	(105.3)	(107.8)
Black	155.3*	−19.47	−57.37	−69.99
	(81.10)	(101.4)	(114.7)	(144.8)
Hispanic	−0.614	9.572	4.712	−86.74
	(92.26)	(118.6)	(130.4)	(169.4)
Chief Justice Election?	52.07	54.42	38.93	44.17
	(115.0)	(113.9)	(162.5)	(162.6)
Incumbent-Challenger Election?	47.56	57.18	133.2*	134.7*
	(51.11)	(50.76)	(72.39)	(72.68)
Statewide Race?	61.57	58.27	308.7*	309.6*
	(114.8)	(109.9)	(181.5)	(177.0)
Did Candidate Win?	174.8***	225.2***	305.0***	329.9***
	(50.72)	(59.29)	(71.68)	(84.69)
Campaign Finance Stringency	87.66*	85.73*	−68.00	−68.85
	(47.65)	(45.78)	(74.76)	(73.04)
female_X_black		443.8***		23.33
		(164.8)		(235.3)
female_X_hispanic		−39.30		210.0
		(184.2)		(263.1)
female_X_incumbent		−65.33		−40.54
		(111.1)		(158.7)
female_X_priorjudge		−23.15		−43.39
		(134.8)		(192.5)
female_X_outcome		−168.8		−82.97
		(114.1)		(163.0)
Observations	449	449	449	449
Number of groups	10	10	10	10

Standard errors in parentheses.
***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, and *$p < 0.1$.

the compiled data and determine whether women's small-donor success translates into victory, and whether this success affects the vote share and margin of victory women receive in SCLR elections.

It is also important to examine spending differences between men and women. Reid (2004) and Frederick and Streb (2008) are among the studies finding that women also outspend men in state judicial elections, and higher levels of spending in judicial elections correlate with greater voter turnout (e.g., Streb and Frederick 2009). The drawback to previous studies is none have looked at spending differences between men and women over a long period of time, and none have examined whether greater levels of campaign contributions to women correlate with greater spending by women. Additionally, examining spending differences between female incumbents and non-incumbents could shed more light on our finding that female incumbents raise less money than female non-incumbents: if female incumbents are found to spend less money than female non-incumbents, this is

likely because they are raising less money than non-incumbents. Future research should examine these possible differences to provide a bigger picture of campaign finance and gendered differences in SCLR campaigns, and this research could shed more light on our finding that female incumbents do worse than female challengers in fundraising.

Despite the pieces of the puzzle left to place, our findings provide a comprehensive look at the effect of sex on campaign contributions on SCLR elections and a new data set to answer this and future questions. We fill in a key gap in the literature and provide a possible bridge to the connection between campaign fundraising success and the success of women in SCLR elections. This research will hopefully provide a springboard for a greater exploration of an area of judicial elections that remains underexplored Appendix.

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Data Availability Statement

A copy of the data used in this project was made electronically available to *Political Research Quarterly* for public use.

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

1. https://publicintegrity.org/politics/high-courts-high-stakes/americas-state-supreme-courts-dont-look-like-america/#:~:text=In_1990%2C_just_10%25_of,%2C_that_figure_hit_42%25.
2. https://cawp.rutgers.edu/facts/levels-office/state-legislature/women-state-legislatures-2024.
3. https://www.npr.org/2024/11/09/g-s1-33583/new-record-women-governors-kelly-ayotte.
4. https://thebadgerproject.org/2023/03/23/states-with-the-most-and-least-female-justices-on-their-top-courts/.
5. https://documents.ncsl.org/wwwncsl/Elections/Contribution-Limits-to-Candidates-2023-2024.pdf.
6. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/state-supreme-court-diversity-may-2024-update.
7. In 2020 dollars.
8. A copy of the data is available as supplemental materials in the electronic version of this article.
9. Because of the non-normal distribution of campaign donation amounts, this variable, the amounts raised from small donations, and the amounts raised from party, PAC and interest groups, law firms, and unions are log-transformed.
10. Due to a lack of nonbinary/transgender SCLR candidates, we use a binary definition of sex.
11. We classify a state as partisan or nonpartisan based on the rules in place at the time of the election.
12. Our control for open-seat races is not reported, due to collinearity.
13. The extreme skew of the non-transformed large donation amounts makes it impossible to accurately translate the findings in Table 1 into real dollars. While the skew for non-transformed small donations is not as severe, it still represents a non-normal distribution. The same issue holds for the mixed-regression results in Table 2. Consequently, researchers should take caution when discussing the findings.
14. To control for possible overlap between incumbency and prior judgeship, we ran a separate model in which the interaction variable between candidate sex and prior judgeships excluded incumbents. The results do not change substantively.
15. Due to a low N, we cannot accurately test whether this null finding is because support from these groups for women is a more recent phenomenon.

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