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**Keywords:** *C Huntington.*

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\* PhD, Assistant Prof  
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**THE DYNAMICS OF CIVIC CULTURE  
IN EX-HABSBURG ITALY AND ELSEWHERE:  
TESTING PUTNAM'S THEORETICAL MODEL<sup>1</sup>**

IONAS AURELIAN RUS\*

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**Abstract.** *This article evaluates and tests Robert D. Putnam's theory concerning the historical origins (and, more precisely, civic traditions, the independent variable) of civic culture (the dependent variable) as well as the main alternative perspective, which is a variation of modernization theory. In the first part of the article, I presented and evaluated the competing theories proposed by Putnam and Huntington in a broad context. The second part has actually tested the various theories. This has been accomplished through the use of data dealing with Italy, and, to a much lesser extent, with Romania.*

**Keywords:** *Civic Culture, Robert Putnam, Ex-Habsburg Italy, Samuel Huntington.*

### Introduction

#### *Culture, Political Culture, Civic Culture*

In this article, I will evaluate Robert D. Putnam's ground-breaking theoretical model concerning the historical origins of the civic tradition, which is the key variable that shapes the level of civic culture at a particular point in time, as well as the merits of an alternative hypothesis. The latter has been associated with authors such as Samuel Huntington, and is a version of modernization theory. It suggests that socio-economic development (greater income, greater education,

\* PhD, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Raymond Walters College, University of Cincinnati.

<sup>1</sup> I would like to thank professors Richard Wilson, in whose graduate seminar, Political Culture, I developed the ideas for this paper, and my former dissertation advisor, Jan Kubik, of Rutgers University, New Brunswick, as well as Elizabeth Radziszewski of Yeshiva University (at that time, a graduate student at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) for their feedback to an earlier version of this text I would like to thank Nicu Popescu for publishing an earlier version of this article with the title "Accounting for Civic Culture: Testing Putnam's Theory", in *EuroJournal.org*, May 2003, in *Eurojournal.org*.

etc.) accounts for the level of civic culture to a larger degree than history/civic tradition. The first part of the article discusses the various definitions of civic culture. It presents and evaluates the competing theories in a broad context, with a focus on the deficiencies of modernization theory, in accounting for civic culture. This will be accomplished partly through an analysis of some of the disconfirming evidence. The data suggests that we need to look at each modernization variable separately. The second part of the article actually tests the two theories.

The cases/geographical areas that I have selected are specifically those for which Putnam does not use pre-1918 statistical data. More precisely, I am referring to those areas that passed from Austrian to Italian rule after World War I. Some of the same types of data will be used as in the historical part of Putnam's study, with an emphasis on the plentiful electoral turnout data. For reasons related to space, I will focus predominantly on process-tracing for the period between the Middle Ages and 1918. Unlike Putnam, I will use as my unit of analysis the smallest geographical areas for which I have data. Therefore, I have roughly 100 units. My findings indicate that, particularly in the rural areas, civic culture had more explanatory power than the level of modernization. Among "modernization" variables, particularly in the areas without a civic tradition, urbanization played an important role. In some parts of northeastern Italy, ethnicity also had an impact.

One of the interesting, and somewhat unexpected, findings of this study is that, in general, and in Italy in particular, there is more than one type of civic culture. The appendices contain most of the actual statistical data used in this paper.

### *The Dependent Variable: Civic Culture*

In this section, I will define civic culture, the dependent variable in this study. Subsequently, I will discuss the two main perspectives: the socio-economic deterministic one, which is a variation of modernization theory, and the cultural perspective that explains the current level of civic culture through the impact of civic traditions rooted in historical patterns. I will show that there is not one "modernization" variable, but that there are several of them. After a discussion of the literature, the case selection will be justified in terms of the need for more in-depth testing, at the level of smaller units of analysis, of Robert D. Putnam's theory, which holds that historical civic traditions explain the level of civic culture at a certain point in time.

Before analyzing civic culture, it is necessary to define culture and political culture, which are broader categories that also include civic culture. According to Ronald Inglehart, "[c]ulture is the subjective component of society's equipment for coping with its environment: the values, attitudes, beliefs, knowledge of its people... Culture does not simply consist of the myths propagated to justify those in power (though this is always an important component). It reflects the entire historical heritage and life experiences of a given people."<sup>2</sup> According to Richard

<sup>2</sup> Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 55.

Wilson, "[i]n the most normative systems that coordinate role relations the preferences of individuals have prescriptive qualities ways to achieve these although they often over symbolic representation socialization. Preferences

Civic culture has become in common, but are also more sociological approaches attitudes of its citizens". A life satisfaction, and common as tendencies toward equals), civic commitment this article represents a Civic culture is a set of equality, as well as trust civic commitment plus passivity and apathy.

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Samuel Huntington, *Twentieth Century*<sup>6</sup>, which manner, defined civic

<sup>3</sup> Richard W. Wilson, "The Politics", vol. 52, no 2, January

<sup>4</sup> Samuel Huntington, *The University of Oklahoma Press*.

<sup>5</sup> Robert D. Putnam, *Making Princeton University Press, 199*

<sup>6</sup> Huntington, *The Third World*

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Wilson, "[i]n the most general sense political cultures are socially constructed normative systems that are the product of both social (for example, rules that coordinate role relationships within organizations) and psychological (for example, the preferences of individuals) influences but are not reducible to either. They have prescriptive qualities that stipulate not only desired ends but also appropriate ways to achieve these ends. The norms are not coterminous with legal codes, although they often overlap. They are manifested in a variety of ways, including symbolic representations and the content of hegemonic discourse, especially of socialization. Preferences, by contrast, are ends desired by individuals."<sup>3</sup>

Civic culture has been defined in a number of ways that have certain elements in common, but are also different in certain respects. Samuel P. Huntington's more sociological approach locates civic culture in the areas of "the values and attitudes of its citizens". According to him, it refers to "feelings of interpersonal trust, life satisfaction, and competence".<sup>4</sup> Robert D. Putnam has defined civic culture as tendencies toward equality, horizontal cooperation (cooperation among equals), civic commitment and solidarity.<sup>5</sup> The definition of civic culture used in this article represents an attempt at synthesizing these and other definitions. Civic culture is a set of values and attitudes that include tendencies toward equality, as well as trust toward, and the ability to cooperate with one's equals, civic commitment plus solidarity, and feelings of efficacy, as distinct from passivity and apathy.

### *The Economic Deterministic Perspective*

Some scholars believe that civic culture is rooted in economic development and related recent changes, as distinct from long-term civic legacies or traditions. Overall, the argument that civic culture is promoted mostly by economic growth and development is flawed for a number of reasons. It tends not to be fully confirmed by the evidence. The "modernization" variables as an aggregate, which will be discussed below, help to account for civic culture less than the historical civic traditions or legacies do. There is a need to look at the various modernization variables separately: industrialization, urbanization, the development of education, etc., in order to determine whether their impact is in the same direction.

Samuel Huntington, in his book *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*<sup>6</sup>, whose argument I am presenting in a somewhat simplified manner, defined civic culture attitudes as feelings of interpersonal trust, life

<sup>3</sup> Richard W Wilson, "The Many Voices of Political Culture: Assessing Different Approaches", in *World Politics*, vol. 52, no 2, January 2000, p. 264.

<sup>4</sup> Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 65.

<sup>5</sup> Robert D Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 124-131 and passim.

<sup>6</sup> Huntington, *The Third Wave*, passim.

satisfaction, and competence. The author noted at that time<sup>7</sup> that civic culture, according to his above-mentioned definition, seldom flourishes in countries with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) *per capita* lower than a certain level. Huntington argued that economic development 'shapes "the values and attitudes of its citizens" in the direction of civic culture. These "in turn, correlate strongly with the existence of democratic institutions".<sup>8</sup>

In other words, in 1991, Huntington viewed civic culture as a dependent variable, and economic performance/development as the independent variable. In his view at that time, economic development leads to civic culture attitudes through various paths, both directly, and indirectly, through by-products of economic performance/development. These include education, a larger middle-class and a greater level of distribution of resources to the less well off.<sup>9</sup>

I will first sketch the process through which economic development could conceivably foster civic culture in a number of ways. A higher personal income would seemingly tend to increase a person's satisfaction with certain aspects of his or her life. This is particularly, or at least partially, true for one's material life, because of the individual's higher standard of living. Of course, this would not necessarily apply to those environments in which aspirations rise faster than actual material welfare.

However, Huntington's analysis is imperfect in a number of ways. Education and (systematic formal) learning, whose meanings are not genuinely distinct in a number of languages, including this author's native Romanian, have an interesting impact. They are operationalized in terms of school attendance, by type of educational institution and/or level of literacy. They do not necessarily constitute an intermediate variable between the independent variable of economic performance on one hand, and intermediate or dependent variables such as civic culture and democracy, on the other hand. In fact, one can conceptualize education as an independent variable, as a key element of modernization that leads to economic growth and development, which would be the dependent variable(s).

The economic deterministic theory of civic culture is problematic in a number of other ways. Numerous counter-examples that tend to disconfirm various patterns suggested by hypotheses such as Huntington's have been both documented and illustrated. An analysis of the regional patterns in pre-Communist Romania neither confirms nor disconfirms the role of wealth, education, or of any of the elements of modernization, or of modernization variables. The only exception was urbanization, which, unlike in southern Italy as presented by Putnam, where it had no explanatory power, seemed to enhance civic culture during a period for which there is enough data, the 1930's and early 1940's. I will simply summarize some largely ignored evidence from numerous studies focusing on various

<sup>7</sup> By contrast, in Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996) etc. the impact of economic development on democracy and civic culture was de-emphasized.

<sup>8</sup> Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p. 65.

<sup>9</sup> Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p. 69 and passim.

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<sup>10</sup> For the Romania  
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*Arhivele Totalitarismului*  
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p. 12-31 and Ionas Aurelian  
in *Arhivele Totalitarismului*  
Also consult the various  
4 vol.; *60 sate Române*  
and D.C. Georgescu, *60*  
României, 1941), as well  
Yale University Press, 1991  
Greenwood Publishers, 1991  
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României", in *Sociolog*  
*Enciclopedia României*  
Sociale al României);  
*Sociologie Românească*  
economică prezentă", i  
(București: Institutul de  
medicală rurală în Rom  
I. Measnicov, "Evoluția  
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<sup>11</sup> Consult, for exa  
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<sup>12</sup> Consult "Cercet  
*Românească*, year 2, no  
a Echipelor Regale Stuc  
and T. Al. Știrbu, "Basar  
1993), p. 402; Gheorgh  
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*Românească*, year 3, no



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er of ways. Education is genuinely distinct in a country, and have an interesting relationship, by type of modernization, necessarily constitute a variable of economic variables such as civic culture can conceptualize the process of modernization that would be the dependent

problematic in a number of ways. I confirm various patterns both documented and undocumented in Communist Romania, or of any of the others. The only exception noted by Putnam, where the data are during a period for which I will simply summarize the findings focusing on various

making of World Order (New York: Basic Books, 1993) democracy and civic culture

villages of Interwar Romania conducted during the 1930's and early 1940's. The Romanian internal official administrative documents from that period also tend to support this picture. The same may be said about a number of articles, and the data focusing on Romanian non-peasants from that period, and particularly more or less educated civil servants and other members of the middle class.<sup>10</sup>

In the case of the Romanian peasantry during the above-mentioned period, my findings related to the most prosperous villages, located in the wealthiest regions of the country, that is, most of the Banat province and the neighboring Arad County, are interesting. These localities were slightly less civic than the villages in the category of intermediate relative prosperity.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, in Banat, increasing levels of prosperity over time went together with civic decline.

The poorest villages located in the least prosperous regions of Romania, that is, most of the rural localities from the province of Bessarabia<sup>12</sup>, and the villages

<sup>10</sup> For the Romanian data, see Ionas Rus, *The Electoral Patterns of the Romanian Far Right during the Interwar Years (1919-1937)* (Saarbrücken: Verlag Dr Muller, 2009), passim, originally published in an abbreviated form in Ionas Aurelian Rus, "The Electoral Patterns of the Romanian Right in the Interwar Years (I)", in *Arhivele Totalitarismului*, no. 4, 1998 (Year 6, no. 21), p. 8-24; Ionas Aurelian Rus, "The Electoral Patterns of the Romanian Right in the Interwar Years (II)", in *Arhivele Totalitarismului*, no. 1-2, 1999 (Year 7, no. 22-23), p. 12-31 and Ionas Aurelian Rus, "The Electoral Patterns of the Romanian Right in the Interwar Years (III)", in *Arhivele Totalitarismului* ("The Archives of Totalitarianism"), no. 3-4, 1999 (Year 7, no. 24-25), p. 8-32. Also consult the various volumes of *Sociologie Românească*, *Enciclopedia României*, (București: 1938-1943), 4 vol.; *60 sate Românești* (București: Institutul de Științe Sociale al României), including Anton Golopenția and D.C. Georgescu, *60 sate Românești* (vol. 1, *Populația*), (București: Institutul de Științe Sociale al României, 1941), as well as Henry L. Roberts, *Rumânia: Political Problems of an Agrarian State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), p. 364-371; David Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania* (New York: Greenwood Publishers, 1968), p. 552; Dumitru Șandru, *Satul românesc între anii 1918 și 1944* (Iași: Casa de Presă și Editura "Cronica", 1996), p. 34-35; Dumitru Șandru, *Creditul agricol în România (1918-1944)*, (București: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1985), p. 68, 146, 152, 155-157; Dumitru Șandru, *Populația rurală a României între cele două Războaie Mondiale* (Iași: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1980); and V.N. Shubkin, "A Comparative Sociological Survey of a Moldavian Village", in G.V. Osipov, *Town, Country and People* (London: Tavistock Publications Limited, 1969). Some of the most relevant articles and archival materials include C. Enescu, "Semnificația alegerilor din Decembrie 1937 în evoluția politică a neamului românesc" (an almost complete reprint from *Sociologie Românească*, year 2, no. 11-12, Noemvrie-Decembrie 1937), in Petre Dăculescu and Klaus Liepelt, *din Renașterea unei democrații: Alegerile din România de la 20 mai 1990* (București: IRSOP, 1991), Anton Golopenția, "Întregirea structurii sociale a României", in *Sociologie Românească*, year 3, no. 1-3, Ianuarie-Martie 1938, *Sociologie Românească*; *Enciclopedia României* (București: 1938-1943), 4 vol.; *60 sate Românești* (București: Institutul de Științe Sociale al României); Anton Golopenția, "Gradul de modernizare al regiunilor rurale ale României", in *Sociologie Românească*, year 4, no. 4-6, Aprilie-Iunie 1939, p. 215; P. Stănculescu and C. Ștefănescu, "Situația economică prezentă", in Anton Golopenția and D.C. Georgescu, *60 sate Românești* (vol. 1, *Populația*), (București: Institutul de Științe Sociale al României, 1941), p. 253-262; Constantin C. Gheorghiu, "Asistența medicală rurală în România", in *Sociologie Românească*, year 2, no. 2-3, Februarie-Martie 1937, p. 84-85; Ing I. Measnicov, "Evoluția după război a proprietății agricole", in *60 sate Românești* (vol. 2, *Situația economică*), (București: Institutul de Științe Sociale al României, 1941), p. 17; Arhivele Statului Oradea, fond Inspectoratul de Jandarmi Oradea and Arhivele Statului București, fond Inspectoratul General al Jandarmeriei, Centrala.

<sup>11</sup> Consult, for example, Adrian C. Brudariu, "Monografia comunei Belint: Cercetări asupra manifestărilor etico-juridice", in *Sociologie Românească*, year 1, no. 7-9, Iulie-Septembrie 1936, p. 48-52.

<sup>12</sup> Consult "Cercetarea monografică de la Copanca a Institutului Social Român din Basarabia", in *Sociologie Românească*, year 2, no. 11-12, Noemvrie-Decembrie, 1937, p. 572-575; Traian Herseni, "Expoziția de lucru a Echipelor Regale Studentești", in *Sociologie Românească*, year 1, no. 1, Ianuarie 1936, p. 41; Const I. Lungu and T. Al. Știrbu, "Basarabia economică", in Ștefan Ciobanu (ed), *Basarabia: Monografie* (Chișinău: Universitas, 1993), p. 402; Gheorghe Meniuc, "Chirileni un sat de plugari din Bălți", in *60 sate Românești*, vol. 4, p. 92, 94-95, 96-97, 99, 100; Petre Ștefănuța, "Obiceiuri și credințe de la Niscani în legătură cu locuința", in *Sociologie Românească*, year 3, no. 7-9, Iulie-Septembrie, 1938, p. 366-369; Petre Ștefănuța, "Obiceiuri și credințe de la

of Southern Dobrogea or Cadrilaterul which were studied<sup>13</sup>, had a population that was significantly less "civic" than in the villages that occupied an intermediate position in terms of the wealth of the inhabitants. The explanations of the low levels of "civic culture" in the wealthiest and in the poorest areas are interesting. They are accounted for by the high levels of what can be described as either selfish individualism, and of the high levels of interpersonal friction (and, in southern Dobrogea, conflict and violence) in the villages at both extremes (the wealthiest and the poorest). The areas that were intermediate in terms of welfare included medium civic and highly civic villages in the historical provinces of Greater Transylvania (Transylvania, Crișana-Maramures and Banat)<sup>14</sup>, Bukovina<sup>15</sup>, Moldova<sup>16</sup>, Wallachia (Muntenia and Oltenia)<sup>17</sup>, and Northern Dobrogea. The mixed evidence does not confirm the enhancing of the level of civic culture by the modernization variables.

Niscani în legătură cu locuința", in *Sociologie Românească*, year 3, no. 7-9, Iulie-Septembrie, 1938, p. 366-369; T. Al. Stârbu, "California României: Regiunea Copanca", in *Sociologie Românească*, year 3, no. 7-9, Iulie-Septembrie 1938, p. 307-310; "Activitatea monografică a Institutului Social Român din Basarabia", in *Sociologie Românească*, year 1, no. 10, Octombrie 1936, p. 46-47; and G. Zane, "Anchetele monografice asupra economiei familiare țărănești ale Seminarului de Economie Politică a Universității din Iași", in *Sociologie Românească*, year 3, no. 7-9, Octombrie-Decembrie 1938, p. 555; and Shubkin.

<sup>13</sup> Consult Const. Noe, "Colonizarea Cadrilaterului", in *Sociologie Românească*, year 3, no. 4-6, Aprilie-Iunie 1938, p. 119, 126-145; M. Cernea, "Atmageaua-Fătăreasca — O colonie de Megleniti din Cadrilater", in *Sociologie Românească*, year 3, no. 4-6, Aprilie-Iunie 1938, p. 181-189; Florea Florescu, "Cusuul din Vale — O colonie de Români timocenii din Cadrilater", in *Sociologie Românească*, year 3, no. 4-6, Aprilie-Iunie 1938, p. 172-173; Cernea, p. 181-189; and Sergiu Ludescu, "Coloniștii din Jurul Capului Caliacra", in *Sociologie Românească*, year 3, no. 10-12, Octombrie-Decembrie 1938.

<sup>14</sup> Consult Florea Florescu, "Cetele de secerătoare din Cuhea-Maramureș", in *Sociologie Românească*, year 2, no. 11-12, Noiembrie-Decembrie 1937, p. 508; Petre Lenghel-Izanu, "Alimentația și îmbrăcămintea în Bârsana-Maramureș", in *Sociologie Românească*, year 4, no. 4-6, Aprilie-Iunie 1939, p. 271-272; Stanciu Stoian, "Procesul educativ în satul Sant din Jud. Năsăud", in *Sociologie Românească*, year 5, no. 1-6, 1943, p. 75, 88; Viorel D. Trifă, "Economia forestieră, mijloc de trai al Moșilor din Cămunul Capsea (Câmpeni)", in *Sociologie Românească*, year 3, no. 4-6, Aprilie-Iunie 1938, p. 208-213; Petru Bartoș, "Un sat expansiv, Caiianul-Mic din Someș. Fața de azi și evoluția în ultimul secol", in *Sociologie Românească*, year 2, no. 9-10, Septembrie-Octombrie 1937, p. 432, 435-439; Gh. Reteganul, "Caiianul-Mic, un sat de voinari și strângători de lână din Munții Someșului", in *60 sate Românești*, vol. 7, p. 58-59; Gh. Reteganul, "Ocupații anexe ale locuitorilor din Caiianul-Mic, Someș: 1-Strânsul de lână și brânză", in *Sociologie Românească*, year 4, no. 1-3, Ianuarie-Martie, 1939, p. 63-67; N.N. Popescu, "Cum caută Dumitru Cotul din Sant să redea consătenilor săi încrederea în cooperare", in *Sociologie Românească*, year 2, no. 5-6, p. 255-257.

<sup>15</sup> Consult Mircea Tiriung, "Bucsoaia, un sat de muncitori forestieri și industriali din Bucovina", in Anton Golopenția and D.C. Georgescu (eds), *60 sate Românești* (vol. 5, *Contribuții la tipologia satelor Românești: Sate cu ocupații anexe*), (București: Institutul de Științe Sociale al României, 1942), p. 177-181; Mircea Tiriung, "Slobozia-Pruncului, un sat de mici agricultori din Bucovina", in Anton Golopenția and D.C. Georgescu (eds), *60 sate Românești* (vol. 4, *Contribuții la tipologia satelor românești: Sate agricole, sate pastorale*), (București: Institutul de Științe Sociale al României, 1943), p. 108, 115.

<sup>16</sup> Consult Școala de Comandante Broșteni-Neamț, Seria 11-a, 1939, "Familia și copilul într-un sat din Neamț (Holda)", in *Sociologie Românească*, Aprilie-Iunie 1939, year 4, no. 4-6, p. 217-242; Mircea Tiriung, M. Dobre and Ghenuța Coman, "Stoesești, un sat cu moșie boierească din Tutova", in *60 sate Românești*, vol. 4, p. 62-63 and Victor Tufescu, "Un Oraș în Declin: Botoșani", in *Sociologie Românească*, year 3, no. 10-12, Octombrie-Decembrie 1938, p. 498-502. Data on the Jews in Moldova may be found in *Orășelul nostru Bivolari* (Haifa, Israel: 'Yozma' Offset Printing, 1981) and Ghitta Sternberg, *Ștefănești: Portrait of a Romanian Shtetl* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1984).

<sup>17</sup> H. H. Stahl, "Rusetu-Brăila, un sat din câmpia românească — Regimul de proprietate agrară", in *Sociologie Românească*, year 2, no. 7-8, Iulie-August 1937, p. 288; Helmut Haufe, "Rusetu-Brăila, un sat din câmpia românească — Structura socială", in *Sociologie Românească*, year 2, no. 7-8, Iulie-August 1937, p. 280.

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<sup>19</sup> See Mattei Dogan, Press, 1989).

<sup>21</sup> Putnam, p. 101.

<sup>22</sup> Putnam, p. 227.

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Pre-1944 Romania is not the only place where modernization does not explain civic culture.<sup>18</sup> Throughout Western Europe since World War II, greater prosperity has tended to lead to greater individualism, and to its corollary, the decline of clericalism and hierarchical relationships. The decline in electoral turnout during recent elections is clearly not an indication of increasing civic culture caused by increasing modernization.<sup>19</sup>

Cautious generalizations are neither impossible, nor irrelevant to an evaluation of the competing theories. A number of works dealing with the topic have suggested the fact that the poorest peasants from least developed villages in southern Italy have displayed the lowest level of civic culture.<sup>20</sup>

According to Putnam's own data, the levels of education in northern Italy (the North) were slightly higher than in southern Italy (the South), but the South was more urbanized than the North. For example, in 1971, 2.6% of the residents of southern Italy were university graduates, as compared to 2.9% of the northern residents.<sup>21</sup> According to the 1975-1989 Euro-barometer figures, 54% of northerners left school by age 15, compared to 57% percent of the southerners. In a somewhat related measurement, in 1986, 51% of northerners lived in towns of 20,000 or fewer inhabitants, and 15% in cities greater than 250,000, as compared to 42% and, respectively, 15% of the southerners.<sup>22</sup>

Even within the context of urbanization, hierarchical and unequal relationships are sometimes only transformed or recast rather than eliminated in certain environments. For example, the importance of the landlords may decrease, but that of the Mafia may increase, as it happened in southern Italy after its incorporation into the Italian polity in 1860.

Overall, the argument that civic culture is promoted by economic growth and development in all of its facets is not confirmed by the evidence. There is a need to look at the various modernization variables separately: industrialization, urbanization, the increasing spread of education, etc. I will deal with the definition and specification of these variables later in the paper.

### *Putnam's Theoretical Model Regarding Civic Culture and Historical Legacy*

Scholars such as Robert D. Putnam<sup>23</sup> emphasize the importance of the relationship between civic culture and history, that is, of the importance of civic traditions. He believes in the explanatory power of historical background in

<sup>18</sup> The decline of civic organizations and of civic culture in general, in the United States has been the main point of Robert D. Putnam's presentation concerning this topic at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, during the winter of 1999. It should be noted that Putnam did not argue that prosperity caused a decline in civic culture. Also see Robert D Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).

<sup>19</sup> See Mattei Dogan, *Sociologie Politică: Opere Alese*, p. 209-354, and other sources.

<sup>20</sup> See, for example, Carlo Levi, *Christ Stopped at Eboli: The Story of a Year* (New York: The Noonday Press, 1989).

<sup>21</sup> Putnam, p. 101.

<sup>22</sup> Putnam, p. 227.

<sup>23</sup> Putnam, *passim*.

terms of the historical relationships between inhabitants, regardless of whether the unit of analysis is the individual or the social class. These relationships include those between the aristocracy/landlords and peasants, and between the aristocracy, including the urban patrician class, and the urban population.

Putnam would explain civic culture in Italy in terms of distant historical background. He argues that, in Italy, the roots of civic culture date back to the republican, non-feudal regimes in the city-states of northern Italy that emerged in the twelfth century. The inhabitants of the northern Italian areas have historically had tendencies toward equality, horizontal cooperation (cooperation among equals), civic commitment and solidarity, that is, civic culture, according to Putnam's definition,<sup>24</sup> starting back during that period. According to him, these tendencies have survived until the contemporary period despite a certain extent of temporary "re-feudalization". The civic traditions continued to manifest themselves through work exchanges among neighbors in the countryside and through the subsidization of civic life by the gentry.<sup>25</sup>

By contrast, the autocratic feudal system developing in southern Italy that was emerging around the same period (the twelfth century) was based on inequality and hierarchy. It bred distrust, individualism, and the growth of vertical cooperation between patron and client rather than of horizontal cooperation.<sup>26</sup> According to this school of thought, the historical legacy has a greater explanatory power than economic performance, wealth, urbanization, and education in accounting for civic culture.

There seems to be a lower degree of correlation between variables such as strong economic development and civic culture than between historical background as defined and described above and civic culture. Putnam's evidence for Italy supports this contention. Therefore, it could be argued that history has a more important role than these variables in accounting for civic culture. On the other hand, Putnam is overemphasizing the relative importance of civic traditions for reasons that will be discussed below.

Putnam's explanation of the southern Italian patterns appears convincing. There are comparatively few loose ends. Nevertheless, we need to look at the overwhelmingly peasant ethnic Albanians of the Roman Catholic<sup>27</sup> faith residing in Italy, and more precisely in southern Italy, mostly since the fifteenth and sixteenth century. The impressive ability of this group to foster, create and fund a national movement that attempted to have an impact on (as well as funded, supplied with books, etc.) the nationalists in Albania itself is striking.<sup>28</sup> Putnam's theory could not account for such a fundamentally mass movement affecting a small ethnic minority.

<sup>24</sup> Putnam, p. 124-131 and passim.

<sup>25</sup> Putnam, p. 135.

<sup>26</sup> Putnam, p. 134-136, 143-148 and passim.

<sup>27</sup> All the populations of present-day Italy discussed in this article have historically been and are currently mostly Roman Catholic.

<sup>28</sup> See, for example, Walter Kolarz, *Myth and Reality in Eastern Europe* (New York: Kennikat Press, 1946), and various general works dealing with the history of Albania.

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One should therefore investigate the possibility that some cultural variable or variables that are in some way linked to ethnography might have played a role in the equation. Putnam's discussion of the Italian north is interesting and has a great deal of explanatory power. It is nevertheless problematic in a number of ways. As I will show below, his study does not consider some alternative origins of civic culture which might be distinct from those presented by him. This is partly due to a case selection bias. He chose to exclude the areas acquired from Austria at the end of World War I.<sup>29</sup> As we shall see, this is due to the risk of conceptual stretching.

In the next section, I will show that the southern part of the former Austrian areas of Tyrol and Trentino, currently the region Trentino-Alto Adige, did not share the civic communal experience of the northern Italian areas geographically located to their south. However, the population of this area did develop a high level of civic culture. Why?

### *Operationalization and Case Selection*

Overall, the testing of Putnam's theory may be accomplished in more than one way. In terms of country, I will select some parts of Italy, but will deal with a larger number of small administrative units, which would permit a better testing of his theory. I will partially replicate his method of operationalization primarily to the case for the period for which I can contribute. I am referring to the Habsburg period before the end of World War I. I would focus primarily, but not exclusively, on elections, and particularly on the second elections under universal suffrage, and more precisely on those of 1911.

One justification for the study of the patterns in particular Italian regions is the fact that Putnam suggests that it would be useful if his theory would be tested for smaller regional units. The case of the present-day region of Trentino-Alto Adige is the most theoretically interesting one in Italy. In this area, the historical origins of the civic tradition are different from the communal ones attributed to the northern Italian areas by Putnam.

I have looked for the existence of types of data that permit a good operationalization that would also work well outside of Italy. The strength of civic culture can be measured through survey data, which can be used for only recent decades, or through statistics on civic involvement. The latter can also cover the more distant past, as Putnam has done for almost all of Italy.<sup>30</sup> However, the historical Austrian data is not as thorough as the Italian one. The data discussed below that are widely available for larger units than the ones used by me (5 to 10, depending on the type of data, as opposed to my 100 units) are not discussed in this article. The available data does not appear to falsify my findings, but tends to support them. Yet it is too fragmentary and incomplete to be of much use.

<sup>29</sup> See Putnam, p. 149-158, 235.

<sup>30</sup> Opinion polling data for a number of countries, such as Finland since World War II, covers a longer period than it is often realized.

Robert D. Putnam provides the relevant survey/polling data for Italy for the period of the 1970's and 1980's.<sup>31</sup> He measures civic involvement in the various present-day regions of Italy between 1860 and 1921 in terms of five components, which strongly correlated to each other.<sup>32</sup> One of them was the strength of mass-based parties from 1919 until 1921, which was "a factor score summarizing the strength of the socialists and Catholic *popolari* in the national elections of 1919 and 1921, as well as their strength on local councils in this period."<sup>33</sup> This data is not strictly comparable with that from other countries. This is partly due to insufficiently sharp division between mass-based parties and elite parties with patronage and clientelistic networks, and due to additional reasons that vary from country to country. For example, in Interwar Romania, small parties often attached themselves to large ones for electoral purposes. This makes it difficult to differentiate between the support for the major party and for the minor party. Therefore, it is not clear whether this component could be effectively used outside of Italy.

Another component was electoral turnout during the elections of 1919 and 1921.<sup>34</sup> Similar data may be obtained for numerous areas outside of Italy, as well as for the areas of Italy that were acquired by that country after World War I, and with whose history Putnam does not deal with.

The scholar from Harvard notes in an endnote that "[m]ost of the territories that later became Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Trentino-Alto Adige were annexed to Italy only at the end of World War I and are thus excluded from this historical analysis..."<sup>35</sup> In fact, a minority of the territory of Friuli-Venezia Giulia was Italian before 1918, but Putnam does not deal with this area, and does not mention this complexity.

In Putnam's data, the Trentino-Alto Adige area ranks in numerous respects as the most "civic" of all the Italian areas. In a number of ways, it is perhaps too "civic" in terms of citizen satisfaction with the regional government. Friuli-Venezia Giulia also has the highest score in at least one category. For example, in six surveys conducted by Putnam and his associates during the period from January 1977 until December 1988, the Trentino Alto-Adige area consistently ranked highest in citizen satisfaction among all the Italian regions.<sup>36</sup>

Putnam notes that "[w]ith one minor anomaly, involving the special region of Trentino-Alto Adige, the citizens of Italy's regions completely concur with our evaluation of those governments... We do not entirely understand why the citizens of Trentino-Alto Adige are happier about their regional government than seems warranted by its performance."<sup>37</sup> In terms of the community leaders'

<sup>31</sup> Putnam, *passim*.

<sup>32</sup> Putnam, p. 149.

<sup>33</sup> Putnam, p. 235.

<sup>34</sup> Putnam, p. 149, 235.

<sup>35</sup> Putnam, p. 235. The entire current region of Trentino-Alto Adige and most of the region of Friulia-Venezia Giulia were part of the Austrian Empire (Cisleithania).

<sup>36</sup> Putnam, p. 77. The question was "How satisfied or unsatisfied are you with the way in which this region is governed?".

<sup>37</sup> Putnam, p. 77, 218.

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<sup>38</sup> Putnam, p. 81.

<sup>39</sup> Putnam, p. 203.

<sup>40</sup> Putnam, p. 97.

<sup>41</sup> Putnam writes

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<sup>42</sup> A part of the te 1991, and are currentl

satisfaction in 1982 concerning the institutional performance of regional governments, the Friuli-Venezia Giulia area ranked the highest. Its performance was also the most overrated according to Putnam, followed by Trentino-Alto Adige.<sup>38</sup> The region also ranked the highest in terms of popular satisfaction with local government.<sup>39</sup>

Similar patterns are expressed most by Putnam's other measurements of civic culture, particularly for Trentino-Alto Adige, which most often occupied second place among Italy's 20 regions, after Emilia-Romagna.<sup>40</sup> The areas of Trentino-Alto Adige and the part of Friuli-Venezia Giulia that joined Italy in 1918 seem the obvious choice selections for an in-depth study, particularly if one also intends to control for the impact of institutions. I am referring to the Italian state between the unification of Italy (1859-1870) and 1918.

In addition to the path described by Putnam that indicates one of the ways in which civic culture may emerge, there are also other ways to reach the same result. There are certain cases, such as that of the Tyrolean German-speakers, and of the Italian-speakers of the Trentino (the southern third of Tyrol within its boundaries between 1814 and 1918), whose evolution will be discussed later, where the patterns are different. The explanation for the great strength of the civic tradition among the German-speaking population, and of the relatively less intense civic tradition among most, but not all, of the Italian-speaking areas at the beginning of the twentieth century are a subject for speculation, including by Putnam himself.<sup>41</sup>

I will only deal with the areas that are partially or completely part of the territories of Italy in its current borders<sup>42</sup> that have been largely de-emphasized by Putnam in his study. One may engage in process-tracing in the study of these areas for the period after World War II. Some areas that became a part of Yugoslavia after World War II after being under Anglo-American administration in 1945-1947 or 1945-1954 will be included in the data. This is partly due to the utility of testing the impact of the civic tradition under this new set of institutions (the Anglo-American ones, that is, the Allied Military Government, AMG). The unit of analysis will be the lowest territorial unit for which there is detailed electoral data for the late Habsburg period.

Putnam does not explain why he is emphasizing the data covering the first two elections after World War I in his study, but not the elections of 1913, the

<sup>38</sup> Putnam, p. 81.

<sup>39</sup> Putnam, p. 203.

<sup>40</sup> Putnam, p. 97, 98, 100, 104, 105, 108, 113.

<sup>41</sup> Putnam writes, "We do not entirely understand why the citizens of Trentino-Alto Adige are happier about their regional government than seems warranted by its performance. However, this Alpine region includes a large, ethnically conscious German-speaking minority, for whom the regional government represents a significant measure of ethnic autonomy and a recognition of their special status. These Sudtirolean may feel particular satisfaction with the symbolism of this "special" region, quite apart from its performance in terms of public policy" See Putnam, p. 218.

<sup>42</sup> A part of the territories of these administrative units were a part of Yugoslavia from 1947 or 1954 until 1991, and are currently a part of Slovenia.

first ones held under universal suffrage in Italy.<sup>43</sup> I nevertheless find his case selection logical. I do believe that the 1907 data from the current Italian territories that were then a part of imperial Austria is inconclusive, because of the feelings of empowerment that many voters felt in that year. This was due to reasons that had nothing to do with civic culture. Yet this feeling of efficacy, although genuine and demonstrable, is difficult to operationalize or measure. The most important reason for the de-emphasis of the treatment of the elections of 1907 is space limitations. The data from elections based on unequal and not quite universal suffrage, which were held prior to 1907, covers larger electoral units. They could not be used to adequately test Putnam's hypothesis. It does not falsify it, but is not particularly conclusive.

Yet, by the time of the second elections held under universal suffrage, it does become obvious that the improvement, if any, brought about by one's electoral choices is merely incremental. In that case, the importance of civic traditions does reassert itself.<sup>44</sup> I will partially replicate Putnam's method by de-emphasizing, but not ignoring, the elections of 1907. To be sure, my findings based related to the elections of 1907 are consistent with those based on those of 1911, the last post-war elections, but not to the same extent.<sup>45</sup>

Overall, the testing of Putnam's theoretical model may be done in more than one way. I have selected the same country, but will deal with only a small part of it. My units of analysis will be the smaller administrative units, which would permit a better testing of the theoretical model. I will partially replicate his method of operationalization primarily to the pre-1918 Habsburg period. I would focus overwhelmingly, but not exclusively, on elections, and particularly on the second elections under universal suffrage, and more precisely those of 1911.

### Testing

The evidence suggests that pre-1918 Habsburg rule does not have a great deal of explanatory power in accounting for the levels of civic culture. The factors that do are civic traditions and urban residence. Other variables that are normally classified in the broader category of modernization do not have a great deal of explanatory power, and sometimes operate in the opposite direction from the one

<sup>43</sup> The 1919 and 1921 elections, unlike those of 1913, were held under a system of proportional representation. See "Italy Reforms Elections: Adopts Proportional Representation — Nitti for Suffrage", in *New York Times*, August 2, 1919. The proposal to make voting compulsory, triggered off by the failure of most adult males to vote in 1919, was defeated.

<sup>44</sup> This was my impression on the basis of the analysis of the results of Austrian imperial and republican and Romanian elections, as well as on the basis of the first elections for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly in Bessarabia in November 1917. I have discussed much of the data in *Electoral Patterns* [Ionas Aurelian Rus, "The Roots and Early Development of Moldovan-Romanian Nationalism in Bessarabia (1900-1917)"], and in *Romanian Review of Political Sciences and International Relations*, vol. 6, no. 2, June 2009, p. 8-22. Most of the data appears in my dissertation, Ionas Aurelian Rus, "Variables Affecting Nation-Building: The Impact of the Ethnic Basis, the Educational System, Industrialization and Sudden Shocks", defended April 2008, degree awarded October 2008.

<sup>45</sup> I have not analyzed the subsequent elections to any large extent because I have not been able to find equally detailed data.

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expected by common sense or variations of modernization theory. The same may be said about other variables that are discussed below.

Could it be that the legacy of Austrian rule<sup>46</sup> might possibly explain the high levels of civic culture in the ex-Austrian areas not covered in Putnam's discussion of historical data? Austrian rule might have marginally helped the development of civic culture in the manner that will be analyzed below. However, the differences between the various areas under Austrian rule that became Italian in 1918 were enormous, much greater than the similarities. They varied in terms of the level of civic culture, urban and rural residence and ethnic group. The statistical evidence in Table A shows this clearly. This seems to indicate that we must look for a causal explanation elsewhere. Two cultural explanations may be suggested, namely ethnographic patterns (ethnicity) and civic culture.

Before analyzing the electoral results, it is important to understand the evolution of the electoral rules, which were largely identical throughout the Austria Empire. I have looked at electoral results for the lower chamber ("Abgeordnetenhaus", or House of Deputies) of the federal or imperial parliament (Reichsrat) of the Austrian part of the Habsburg or Dual Monarchy.<sup>47</sup> Under the system that operated between the late 1870's until 1907, throughout all the areas under review, there were five electoral curiae or classes that selected their deputies separately. They included those of the great landowners, of the chambers of commerce and industry, and of the cities, market towns and industrial towns, for which the elections were direct. There was also the curia of the taxpayers from rural communities, and the general or universal curia, whose electorate included almost all the literate males older than twenty-four. In the last two, the voters selected electors who chose the deputies.<sup>48</sup>

Between 1907 and 1914, but not before that, the Austrian elections fit my minimalist definition of multiparty democratic elections.<sup>49</sup> The elections were multi-party, and generally free and fair. There was universal, equal, secret suffrage for all adult males twenty-four years and older who had resided for one year or more in their commune. If no candidate obtained an absolute majority of the votes cast in a single-member constituency district, then there was a runoff.<sup>50</sup>

One of the areas to which we shall look at was known as the Austrian Littoral/Coastal Land (Kustenland) before 1918, known as Venezia Giulia during

<sup>46</sup> The impact of Austrian rule in Lombardy between 1706 and 1796, and between 1814 and 1859, and in Veneto before 1866 will not be discussed in this article, but the evidence indicates that it was less significant than in the areas that remained under Austrian rule in 1866-1918. The argument could be made that the greater level of civic culture in the region of Lombardia than in the Veneto region could partly be explained by historical legacy (the greater length of Austrian rule).

<sup>47</sup> The other part was Hungary Bosnia-Herzegovina was neither a part of Austria, nor of Hungary, but the Dual Monarchy annexed it only in 1918.

<sup>48</sup> See, for example, the data in "Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen in den im Reichsrat Vertretenen Königreichen und Ländern für das Jahr 1900/1901", in *Osterreichische Statistik*, vol. 59, no. 3 (Wien: Karl Gerold's Sohn, 1902), and *Osterreichische Statistik*, vol. 49 (Wien: Karl Gerold's Sohn, 1898).

<sup>49</sup> For more details on Austrian elections, see Ionas Aurelian Rus, "Variables Affecting Nation-Building: The Impact of the Ethnic Basis, the Educational System, Industrialization and Sudden Shocks".

<sup>50</sup> Putnam looks only at the electoral results for the central legislature, and so do I.

the period of Italian rule between 1918 and 1943-1945.<sup>51</sup> It was made up of three former Austrian crownlands. It is currently only partially under Italian rule. The Italian part of the old *Kustenland* forms a majority of the territory and population of the present-day region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia.

The other sections of the old territory became a part of Yugoslavia, and later of independent Slovenia and Croatia, after World War II. Tito's Yugoslavia de facto annexed them, mostly in 1945-1947.<sup>52</sup> The so-called Zone B of the Territory of Trieste, which had been under Yugoslav administration between 1945 and 1954, but which had not been a part of the city of Trieste within its borders during the Austrian period, became a part of Yugoslavia in 1954.<sup>53</sup>

Two of these territories of the Austrian Littoral were the western and southwestern coastal parts of the northern duchy of Gorizia-Gradiska or Gorz-Gradiska in German, and the city of Trieste or Triest, which was located in the western part of the area. The other one was the southern duchy of Istria or Istrien (see the electoral maps in Appendix B). The Italian ethnic areas were located in the more western parts of *Kustenland*. The areas to their east were mostly Slovenian in the north, and mostly Croatian in the south.<sup>54</sup>

The southern part of the Austrian land of Tyrol also came under Italian rule in 1918. The southern part, Trentino, the current autonomous province of Trento, was and is overwhelmingly ethnically Italian, while Alto Adige/South Tyrol was and is overwhelmingly ethnically German.<sup>55</sup>

The highest levels of civic culture within the pre-1918 Austrian territories of Italy were displayed by the overwhelmingly ethnically Italian population of the city of Trieste, and by the ethnically Italian population of the southwestern part of the crownland of Gorizia and Gradisca. The Italian portions of the latter crownland included the Gradisca (more northern) and Monfalcone (more southern) areas. In both of the elections based on universal suffrage, those of 1907 and 1911, these were the areas with the highest turnouts. Voter participation was much higher than in the Slovene areas of the rest of the crownland of Gorizia and Gradiska, and than in both the ethnically German and ethnically Italian parts of South Tyrol and Trentino, which will be discussed below. The same pattern also applied to the pre-1907 curial elections.

<sup>51</sup> The Austrian Littoral, although technically under Italian rule, was under Nazi German administration in 1943-1945.

<sup>52</sup> Yugoslav troops occupied the overwhelming part of the old *Kustenland/Venezia Giulia* in 1945, and the area was officially annexed to Yugoslavia in 1947.

<sup>53</sup> A small part of Zone A, which was under British and American military administration in 1945-1954 was also given to Yugoslavia.

<sup>54</sup> See the ethnic map in Bogdan C. Novak, *Trieste, 1941-1954: The Ethnic, Political, and Ideological Struggle* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 5.

<sup>55</sup> Whereas the overwhelmingly German-speaking population of the present-day Austrian republic has gradually acquired an Austrian identity, especially after 1945, and only a small minority of the Austrians would identify themselves as ethnic Germans, the German-speakers of South Tyrol in Italy still identify themselves as ethnic Germans. See Ionas Aurelian Rus, "Measuring the Intensity of the Various Nationalisms in Austria (1907-1962)", paper presented at the 14<sup>th</sup> Annual Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN), Harriman Institute, Columbia University, April 2009. The terms ethnic Germans and German-speakers are interchangeable within the Italian context for the purposes of this paper.

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The analysis of the electoral data during the period before the first democratic elections is not fruitful enough to be included in a study of this length. However, throughout the Italian areas acquired by Italy from the Habsburg monarchy in 1918 with a civic tradition, there was a slightly higher turnout among the members of the lower curiae in Tyrol, and a significantly higher one in Trieste. Therefore, the turnout statistics are not consistent with any variation of modernization theory that would suggest that economically better off people are more civic.

My historical explanation of this pattern, both before 1907 and from that year onward, is partially consistent with Putnam's views. Like the Italian communes about which Putnam writes about, Trieste was originally an independent commune until 1382, when it accepted Austrian/Habsburg rule in order not to fall under Venetian rule. We would expect a high level of civic culture. Not surprisingly, the city of Trieste consistently had the highest electoral turnout of any urban locality within the zone, and a higher one than any rural area. During the first round of the 1911 elections, the electoral turnout in the various districts of the city of Trieste and of its hinterland varied from 80 and 88% (see table A).<sup>56</sup>

The highest turnout in the Trieste area was in the district that included the hinterland of the city, whereas the lowest turnout was in the inner city. There are a large number of possible explanations dealing with the ethnic factor, none of which is backed up by a great deal of confirming evidence. However, based on the turnout and of the distribution of vote among Italian and Slovene parties, and with everything else being equal, it is clear that inner city and Italians/Italian-speakers were not inherently more civic<sup>57</sup> than suburban and hinterland and Slovenes/Slovene-speakers in the Trieste area.<sup>58</sup> The groups, from the most civic to the least civic, were, in terms of ethnicity, rural Slovenes, rural Italians, urban Italians and urban Slovenes, and in terms of well-being, the less well-off suburbs and hinterland and then the more well-off areas of the inner city.<sup>59</sup>

On the territory of the former duchy of Gorizia and Gradisca, the boundaries of the electoral districts do allow us to differentiate between various areas. The

<sup>56</sup> All the electoral results for 1911, and the ethnic statistics for 1910, are available in, "Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen in den im Reichsrate Vertretenen Königreichen und Ländern im Jahre 1911", in *Osterreichische Statistik* (new series), vol. 7, no. 1 (Wien: Karl Gerold's Sohn, 1912). The aggregate statistics appear in English in sources such as Robert A. Kann, *The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1848-1918* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), p. 300-302. On the magnitude of the newspaper readership in Trieste, see Leo Valiani, *The End of Austria-Hungary* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), p. 4.

<sup>57</sup> During the elections of 1949 in Zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste, the overwhelmingly ethnically Italian city of Trieste had a lower turnout than the Slovene hinterland. Only 9238% of those who received their electoral certificates in the city cast ballots on June 12, 1949. By contrast, 9421% of those in the hinterland cast ballots on June 19, 1949. The percentages among those included in the electoral rolls were 8522% and 8909%. See Novak, *Trieste*, p. 305-307, and also p. 394-397 on the 1952 elections. While 1567% of all the votes in Zone A of FTT in 1949 were ethnically Slovene, 2217% of the population was ethnically Slovene in 1950 according to the Allied Military Government census. See Novak, p. 268, 308-309.

<sup>58</sup> The Austrian census classified an individual's ethnic identity based on colloquial tongue ("Umgangssprache").

<sup>59</sup> Glenda Sluga shows that participation in street rallies and demonstrations was more prevalent among poorer than among wealthier women in 1945-1954. See Glenda Sluga, *The Problem of Trieste and the Italo-Yugoslav Border: Difference, Identity, and Sovereignty in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Albany, State University of New York Press, 2001), passim. It is my impression that the greater likelihood of the poorer inhabitants,

southwestern part, the Monfalcone area, had been exposed to the communal experience, and to a period of Venetian rule. On the other hand, the Gradisca area did not have a civic tradition. The data in Table A provides a more nuanced perspective of the electoral geography. In the electoral units with a civic tradition, the turnout in the first round was 83-85%. In the completely non-civic areas, the turnout was only between 25.11% and 36.38%. In the intermediate cases, where a part of the district shared a civic tradition while another part did not, turnout ranged from 56.31% to 81.11%. In the rural "intermediate" areas, the mostly non-civic districts had a turnout that was smaller than two-thirds, and the mostly civic areas had higher turnouts.

The only place where the ordinal ranking of the "civicness" of the district is not necessarily identical with the ranking of the electoral turnout is the mostly Italian, mostly non-civic town of Gorizia, which had a turnout of 72.00% in the first round and 49.42% in the second round.<sup>60</sup> The difference between the turnout in the first and in the second round is greater than in any other district to which I have looked at. The evidence thus neither clearly confirms nor clearly disconfirms the possibility that urbanization might have promoted the development of civic culture.

Is there any other potential explanation for this political phenomenon, such as something related to ethnic and related differences, in Gorizia-Gradiska? The answer is "no". It should be kept in mind that one of the alternative explanations for the phenomenon, namely ethnicity (Italian vs. Slovene) does not have any explanatory power. To be sure, the electoral districts of the Austrian administration do not clearly coincide with the historical divisions. The districts that were partially civic, but mostly non-civic, had turnouts that ranged from 56.31% to 64.16%. Those that were completely non-civic had voter turnout percentages that ranged from 25.11% to 33.41%. In the case of the ethnic Italian districts with a civic tradition, the turnout was higher than 81.11%, whereas in the Italian areas whose territories were half from the civic area, and half from the non-civic, the turnout was only slightly less than two-thirds.

The picture seems clear. In the mixed districts (partly civic, partly non-civic), with everything else being equal, the greater the surface of the district that had been civic, the greater was the turnout. Should we assume that, within the mixed electoral districts, it was precisely the more civic communes that had the higher turnout? The electoral statistics do not provide us with an answer. However, other types of evidence also document the salience of the civic tradition at the local level.

We need to look at the areas with a Slovene majority that had a civic tradition that were geographically located around Gorizia, and are currently partly in Italy and partly in Slovenia. In 1945-1946, these villages, unlike the non-civic

including of much of the ethnically Italian industrial proletariat, of Zone A of the Free Trieste Territory to participate in collective action in favor of Yugoslav rule, or of an independent Trieste, obscured the fact that most inhabitants of the zone always favored union with Italy in 1945-1954. See Rus, "Variables", p. 504-506.

<sup>60</sup> Unless it is specified otherwise, the electoral statistics refer to the first or only round of elections rather than to the runoff, or to the average of the two.

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<sup>62</sup> See A. E. Moore

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Slovene villages, were characterized by mass support for the Slovene democrats and anti-Communists. The inhabitants of these rural areas supported precisely the Slovene Christian Democrat and Slovene Liberal "mass parties" (as Putnam would define them) in the local elections, etc., during the period when the area was under Anglo-American administration.<sup>61</sup> The population of the other ethnically Slovene villages for the most part supported the Yugoslav Communists. In the last days of World War II, the Yugoslav Communists controlled both the "civic" and the "non-civic" Slovene villages. Therefore, recent history did not have a great deal of explanatory power. Following Putnam's operationalization dealing with the early interwar period, namely (democratic) "mass parties", I will take the support for the non-Communists as evidence of civic behavior.

The analysis of the data from Istria, which is mostly in Croatia and Slovenia rather than in Italy, tends to confirm the same conclusions as the data from Trieste and Gorizia-Gradisca areas. However, there are a few reasons why we should approach the data carefully. First, the civic tradition was not home grown, but it emerged, in a slightly diluted form, during the period when the area was a Venetian territory, in the same manner in which it appeared in other parts of northern Italy. Venice conquered it between 1207 and 1322.<sup>62</sup> In the small part of Istria that is currently a part of Italy, the turnout in the civic, mostly Slovene, district was 68%. By contrast, in the mostly, but not completely, non-civic, predominantly ethnically Italian part (in 1910), it was 43%. Ironically, the latter territory is now a part of Slovenia. The data for Istria does not falsify my contention, and it shows that interethnic differences do not explain the differences in electoral participation.

By far the most interesting patterns of civic culture are found in the other area whose civic tradition prior to the 1970's is not covered extensively by Putnam. The present-day Italian region of Trentino-Alto Adige/South Tyrol included the southern and central areas of the crownland of Tyrol between 1814<sup>63</sup> and the end of World War I in 1918. South Tyrol, its northern part, has been, and still is, ethnically and linguistically German since the Middle Ages. By contrast, the southern part, Trentino, has been, and still is, linguistically and ethnically Italian. The electoral turnout during the elections of 1911, and on previous occasions, was substantially higher among the overwhelmingly Italian population of Venezia Giulia than among the Italians in Trentino.

Overall, it was the German-speakers of historical Tyrol, the northern and eastern parts of which are a part of Austria, and more pertinently those of South Tyrol, who were, for various historical reasons, more civic than the people of Trentino. Yet the dividing lines are not, just like in Venezia Giulia, those of ethnicity and language, but of civic traditions. The areas that had been part of the historical principality of Tyrol were in 1911 substantially more civic than those that had

<sup>61</sup> See, for example, Novak, p. 207-239, and a number of sources listed in that book's bibliography.

<sup>62</sup> See A. E. Moodie, *The Italo-Yugoslav Boundary*, 1945, p. 67-68, 227-229.

<sup>63</sup> The territory was also under Austrian rule between 1802 and 1805.

historically been part of the bishopric of Trent, which was Italian-speaking, and of the smaller German-speaking bishopric of Brixen, currently in South Tyrol.<sup>64</sup>

Almost all the German-speaking areas and a minority of the Italian-speaking areas of South Tyrol had been under Habsburg rule since the fourteenth century. The above-mentioned bishoprics were added later. Tyrol was under continuous Austrian rule from 1814 until 1918. Overall, the German areas tended to be more civic in their electoral turnouts than the Italian areas in 1911. Yet it was the civic tradition, not German ethnicity, which helped account for the higher voter participation. The Tyrolean civic tradition has certain similarities with the Swiss civic tradition, though it is not republican. It is different from the northern "communal" Italian one discussed by Putnam in general, and by me in the case of Trieste and adjacent areas.

The origins of this other, more rural, type of civic tradition can be traced to the medieval history of the Tyrol. Most of the peasants of Tyrol never became serfs, but rather the vassals of the feudal lords, whom they owed military service.<sup>65</sup> Evidence of the strength of civic culture can be documented for centuries, including during the modern period, which, for the purposes of this paper, started in the late eighteenth century. Unlike in most of Europe, and especially Western Europe, not just the nobles, knights, and urban citizens, but also the peasants obtained representation in the Tyrol Diet (Landtag) or legislature, beginning in 1293, before the Habsburg dynasty acquired the area in 1363.

Starting in 1404, the Tyrolean diet made decisions by majority vote. In 1342, the prince consort of the ruler of the Tyrol decreed that, "(1) All rights and liberties are exercised by the entire population through its representatives, (2) No taxes can be levied without the consent of the entire population". The informal, patriarchal, egalitarian tradition of Tyrol, which continued under Habsburg rule, explains why the commoners and the nobility had the right to address to their Habsburg rulers, who in most cases were also Holy Roman Emperors and later emperors of Austria, with the singular "du" ("thou").<sup>66</sup>

In 1511, the Tyroleans' sole military obligation became to defend their land against foreign invasion through their militia, Landsturm, or general levy of the population, and particularly of the peasants. They no longer had to fight in foreign wars. "Each Alpine valley had its own voluntary musket company that underwent regular, rigid training and in which every able-bodied Tyrolean served", in a manner reminiscent of the Swiss militia.<sup>67</sup> Similar patterns spread to those Italian ethnic areas that were acquired overtime, until the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but not to those that were acquired in 1802-1803/1814. All of these factors lie at the root of the regional distribution of the Tyrolean civic tradition.

<sup>64</sup> The area that had been under the rule of the bishops of Brixen came under the overlordship of Tyrol during the 15<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>65</sup> See, for example, WA Baillie-Grohman, *The Land in the Mountains* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1907), p. 109-113. Also see the official history of the Austrian land of Tyrol, "Tirol, Unser Land", in the "History" section, at <http://www.tirol.gv.at/en/history/>, where it is noted that, "In the Late Middle Ages, a free peasantry was the norm in the Tyrol rather than serfdom".

<sup>66</sup> Maurice Czikkann-Zichy, *Turmoil in South Tyrol: New Hope for National Harmony* (New York: Exposition Press, 1960), p. 18.

<sup>67</sup> Czikkann-Zichy, p. 19; and Clive Holland, *Tyrol and Its People* (London: Methuen and Co, 1909), p. 15-51, and especially p. 34.

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<sup>68</sup> The same was also correlated with a weaker ethnic Germans Putnam's measurements of old-fashioned intent in this study is to be either the strength or wealth. However, during the 1946, and for the actual measurements of "democrisina", in Andrea I *Il Novecento* (Bologna: Mulino, 1997), p. 1.

<sup>69</sup> The revolt was against the 1810 border between Bavaria and *Adige-South Tyrol. Italy's Frontier* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 1.

<sup>70</sup> See, for example, E. J. Honegger, *The Tyroleans* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 18.

<sup>71</sup> See the electoral turnouts in the *Konigreichen und Landen*

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A strong tendency toward equality, (grass-roots) liberty, provincialism, as well as the continuation of an informal patriarchal tradition, were clearly salient features of the medieval and post-medieval political culture of the principality of Tyrol.<sup>68</sup> This was a somewhat different combination than the "communal" political culture in northern Italy. The Tyrolean patterns seem to account for the development of civic culture in a somewhat larger geographical unit than the originally small Italian communes/city-states, or for that matter, the individual Swiss cantons.

The civic spirit had been able to reduce transaction costs throughout Tyrolean history. The civic culture of the Tyroleans who shared this tradition, whether German or Italian, was displayed on the occasion of Andreas Hofer's 1809 ultimately failed uprising on behalf of the Habsburgs, which had temporarily lost Tyrol in 1805. The revolt was against the rule of Napoleon Bonaparte's ally/satellite, the Kingdom of Bavaria, which acquired Austrian Tyrol in 1806, and against the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy, which had later acquired the ethnic Italian areas and a small part of the ethnic German ones.<sup>69</sup>

The difference between the areas of Tyrol that shared this civic tradition and those that did not is documented by historical data, by travelers' accounts from around 1900, and by the electoral evidence. The difference often tended to be expressed in ethnic terms, which oversimplified and distorted the picture. There was no ethnically German district that was mostly or completely non-civic, but there were ethnically Italian civic and non-civic districts. For example, W.A. Baillie-Grohman, a partly Austrian, partly British, aristocrat whose family owned a Tyrolean castle, noted that in the Italian areas, the "intense competition makes the conditions of all labor infinitely harder".<sup>70</sup> The higher level of civic culture of the areas inhabited predominantly by ethnic Germans manifested itself in higher electoral turnouts than in the Italian areas. This was particularly true in the elections of 1911, when this pattern was striking, and when the differences were greater than in 1907.<sup>71</sup> Moreover, one can not dismiss the electoral turnout

<sup>68</sup> The same was also true of intense Catholicism. Whereas among Italians, intense Catholicism is correlated with a weaker civic culture (see Putnam, p. 107-109), this has not been true among the Tyrolean ethnic Germans. Putnam's questions also tend to combine the measurement of levels of religiosity with measurements of old-fashioned conservatism/clericalism (eg, voting against the legalization of divorce). My intent in this study is to be value-neutral. Votes for (Italian) Christian Democrats are not in any way linked with either the strength or weakness of civic culture in the Italian ethnic areas discussed in this article since 1945. However, during the — 1918 Habsburg era, Italian liberal parties have performed the best in the more civic areas inhabited by ethnic Italians discussed in this article. For a discussion of the elections in Trentino since 1946, and for the actual numbers, see Mario Brunazzo e Sergio Fabbrini "La geografia elettorale: l'egemonia democristiana", in Andrea Leonardi and Paolo Pombeni (eds), *Storia del Trentino*, vol 6 (*L'età contemporanea Il Novecento*) (Bologna: Mulino, 2005), p. 255-280.

<sup>69</sup> The revolt was against French and Bavarian anti-clericalism but for Tyrolean constitutionalism. The 1810 border between Bavaria and the Kingdom of Italy was slightly north of Bolzano. See Mario Toscano, *Alto Adige-South Tyrol, Italy's Frontier with the German World* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), p. 1.

<sup>70</sup> See, for example, Baillie-Grohman, p. 106-127, and particularly p. 120. The inhabitants of Trentino were poorer than those of the German ethnic areas to its north. The power of landowners was also greater in Trentino.

<sup>71</sup> See the electoral results in "Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen in den im Reichsrat Vertretenen Königreichen und Ländern im Jahre 1911", *passim*.

figures as flukes given the much greater likelihood of ethnic Germans than of ethnic Germans to join civil society associations.<sup>72</sup>

For example, in most of the 22 German rural electoral districts, in the elections of 1911 for the Austrian Chamber of Deputies, the rate of turnout (in the first round of elections) was 80% or higher in seven electoral units. It was between 70% and 80% in 14 electoral districts. In one district, the figure was 60-70%, and in another one between 55 and 60%.

Among German-speaking electoral units that were located completely in areas with civic traditions, with one exception, the voter turnout was between more than 71% and almost 85%. For the German areas that were partially located in the territories with a civic tradition, and for those that had less of a civic tradition, the percentage varied between slightly less than 60% and more than 75%. The average non-weighted turnout per district was 76.08%, and even higher for the "fully" civic districts, namely 77.68%. For the "mostly civic" and for the "partly civic" areas<sup>73</sup>, it was lower, namely 74.85% and 70.96%, respectively. For the non-civic areas, it was 69.13%.

It should be noted that the "non-civic" areas of the Bishopric of Brixen, which were a part of Tyrol continuously since the fifteenth century, were less "non-civic" than those of the Bishopric of Trento, which were under various degrees of lighter Austrian overlordship at various times from around 1665 onward. As a result, the differences in turnout between the most civic and the least civic districts (about 8.55%) in the ethnic German areas are, not surprisingly, less striking than in the case of the ethnic Italian ones (21.46%).

In the Italian rural electoral districts, in the first round of elections, the average turnout was substantially lower than in the German areas, on average 51.04%. For the non-civic areas, the percentage was 45.25%. For the mostly Italian areas that had been under the control of the counts of Tyrol rather than of the bishops of Trent before the era of the Napoleonic Wars, the turnout was 66.71%. By contrast, the districts that were partly civic, that is, whose territories included civic as well as non-civic areas, had an average turnout of 59.10%. The figure was 57.68% for the district that was mostly, but not completely, non-civic.

In the ethnically Italian areas that had been gradually annexed by the principality of Tyrol before the time of Napoleon, civic tradition emerged indirectly (peasant freedom, the emergence of a village militia, etc.), and chronologically after the German areas.<sup>74</sup> The range of turnout, with one exception, was between almost 60% and more than 80%, with those areas that had been directly included in the principality of Tyrol for a longer period having higher turnouts. For the Italian non-civic areas, the range was between 28.21% and 58.55%, with eight cases below 50% and six above. In the four rural districts that were partially in the civic area, the turnout ranged from 57.68% and 62.94% in only one rural district with a civic tradition.

<sup>72</sup> See the statistics in Dennison I Rusinow, *Italy's Austrian Heritage* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 36.

<sup>73</sup> This does not measure how intensely civic the population of a district was, but what proportion of the area of a district had a civic history.

<sup>74</sup> See Eric R. Wolf and John W. Cole, *The Hidden Frontier: Ecology and Ethnicity in an Alpine Valley* (New York: Academic Press, 1974) for details concerning a village where this process actually took place.

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The Germans and the Italians were not the only ethnic groups in the area. There was also a distinct, Romance-speaking, population that used a language, patois or dialect close to Italian, namely the Ladins.<sup>75</sup> The general rule also applies in their case. The greater the part of a district that had a pre-modern civic tradition, the greater is the turnout. In the two mostly civic Tyrolean rural districts inhabited by Ladins, which were located in the "German area", and had been a part of the principality of Tyrol for as long a period of time as adjacent German areas, the turnout was 55.93%. The fact that the inhabitants of these rural areas, and of the urban centers in their midst, were located in German electoral districts, and could, and did, vote only for ethnic German candidates, might have kept popular participation in the elections down. Therefore, a lower electoral turnout does not necessarily imply the low level of civic culture, but might suggest that electoral participation is encouraged by having one's preferred candidates on the ballot.

We should tentatively conclude that in non-urban electoral districts, the variable that has the greatest explanatory power in accounting for electoral turnout is civic traditions. The second most important factor seems to be ethnicity. Ethnic Germans were more likely to vote even if one controls for other factors.<sup>76</sup>

The electoral turnouts in the urban areas were high, and tended to be reasonably uniform throughout the province. The civic traditions of the urban localities and of the surrounding areas do not have a great deal of explanatory power in accounting for voter turnout.

It should nevertheless be kept in mind that the significant differences between the rural predominantly ethnic German, Italian or Ladin districts, and between the civic and the non-civic ones, was less applicable to the urban areas. The average turnout in the six Italian cities and towns was 71.59%, 78.85% in the thirteen German ones, and 55.3% in the Ladin town of Ampezzo, which had a civic tradition. The cities surrounded by areas without a civic tradition had turnouts of 78.49% in the German town in this category, and 69.89% in the Italian ones. In the areas with a civic tradition, the turnouts were 75.01% in the Italian areas, and 78.88% in the German areas.

In two of the six predominantly Italian urban localities, one civic and another one non-civic (i.e., without a civic tradition), more than 80% of the inhabitants with the right to vote cast ballots. The same may be said as well about the electorate of 6 of the 15 mostly German urban localities, all of which were in areas with a civic tradition. The turnout was between 70 and 80% in four civic and two non-civic predominantly German urban localities, and in one non-civic Italian one. The turnout was between 60 and 70% in three Italian non-civic towns, and in two civic German ones. The localities where the turnout was between 55 and 60% included a German non-civic and a Ladin civic one.

<sup>75</sup> The Ladins are a small ethnic group related to the Rhaeto-Romans of Switzerland, who speak Romansch. The Austrian authorities classified them as Italian-speaking, but the Italian authorities have traditionally labeled them as Ladin-speaking. Their culture has been more similar to that of the ethnic Germans than to that of the ethnic Italians.

<sup>76</sup> This was subsequently accurate during the elections of 1921 in the mostly German South Tyrol, held under Italian rule too, when a population of Italian citizenship that was only 83.95% ethnically German voted for the German League in a proportion of almost 90%.

With one exception, the turnout rates for the voters from German urban localities with a civic tradition was greater than two-thirds, in a minority of the cases even more than 80%, in one case exceeding even 90%. For Italian "civic" urban localities, the turnout was between two-thirds and slightly more than four-fifths. The only outliers, in whose cases the percentage was slightly more than 55%, were a Ladin-speaking town, and a German town from an area without a civic tradition.

It is precisely the electoral patterns in the urban localities that are the most consistent with Putnam's theory concerning civic culture. It is logical to consider seriously the possibilities that urbanization in Trentino increased the level of civic culture. It is likely that a number of factors induced the Italian population from the areas without a civic tradition to be increasingly civic during the post-1918 period of Italian rule.<sup>77</sup> As we have already seen, Putnam's surveys seem to suggest that the differences between the Italians from Trentino and the overwhelmingly German population with a civic tradition were reduced rather than eliminated. This seems, of course, fully consistent with the 1911 data for urban areas, as well as for the "civicness" patterns in rural areas.

One of the factors that accounts for this change was the relocation of rural inhabitants to large and small urban localities, all of whom inhabited parts of urban electoral districts before 1918. Contemporary observers at the beginning of the twentieth century also noted the increasingly civic behavior of an ever larger proportion of the Italian population. They emphasized this especially about the Italians who moved north to the predominantly German areas, as well as to urban areas.<sup>78</sup> These processes also continued after 1918. One observes that during the elections of 1924, the ethnic Italians in the mostly ethnically German areas of South Tyrol, whether natives or immigrants from other areas, had turnouts that were comparable to those of the ethnic Germans.<sup>79</sup> These changes largely account for the increasing civic culture among the ethnic Italians, who currently represent two-thirds of the population of the present-day region of Trentino-Alto Adige.

There is also a need to test a popular alternative hypothesis. Are we dealing with "historical legacy variables" that we could call something like "Habsburg legacy", which do not operate only inside Italy, but elsewhere? The significant differences between various areas within the Habsburg realm have already been noted. They superficially do not make this argument particularly persuasive. The difference in the rates of turnout in the areas that I have analyzed in this article range from less than 30% to more than 80% between areas that are socio-economically very similar. It is difficult to explain these differences on the basis of this theory. Significantly, pre-World War I observers did not claim that the local Italians of Trentino, Trieste, etc., were more civic than the inhabitants from south of the border, in the pre-1918 Italian Kingdom.<sup>80</sup> Moreover, the differences

<sup>77</sup> Hitler's Germany controlled Trentino, as well as the other areas of Italy that had been under Habsburg rule until 1918, and between 1943 and 1945.

<sup>78</sup> Baillie-Grohman, p. 120.

<sup>79</sup> See the electoral statistics in Rusinow, p. 173. The evidence also suggests that the ethnic Italian inhabitants who settled in the area originated from the more civic parts of Italy.

<sup>80</sup> In fact, the extensive use of ethnic Italians from Trentino to administer Lombardy and Venice under Austrian rule was probably caused by their easier integration into a hierarchical professional civil service. See CA Macartney, *The Habsburg Empire, 1790-1918* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1969), p. 649.

between the above monarchy were significant. Any explanatory power is very small.

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<sup>81</sup> See Holland, p. 3.

<sup>82</sup> Holland writes that often found wanting in Duckworth & Co, 1905).

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between the above-mentioned Tyrolean patterns and other parts of the Habsburg monarchy were significant. Overall, the Habsburg legacy does not seem to have any explanatory power in the Italian case.

The variation in occupations, and education, as classified by the census is very small. Literacy was quasi-universal in the areas of present-day Italy discussed in this article, and the non-agricultural population usually represented between one-third and two-fifths of the population. The areas that had proportionally the highest employment in agriculture had above average electoral turnouts. For example, in the Italian area, the substantially more agrarian towns in the urban electoral district of Rovereto had a higher turnout than the less agricultural city of Trento. These aspects of modernization theory do not explain the patterns of electoral turnout very well.

A variation in voter turnout from 28.21% to 84.58% might be partly explained by landscape. The people in the more mountainous areas, that is, the areas with a higher elevation/altitude, where transportation and communication was more difficult, were, strangely enough, more likely to vote. This is true for both rural and urban areas. The data therefore goes against the expectations based on modernization theory (e.g., the easier the transportation and communication, the greater the turnout).

Indeed, if one takes into account the landscape, one arrives at the conclusion that civic culture has even more explanatory power than if one does not consider landscape. Most of the differences between Germans and Italians seem to disappear if one controls for landscape. What has not been clarified is why the inhabitants in more mountainous areas were more civic. The argument that greater adversity created a greater need for horizontal collaboration could not be empirically evaluated due to insufficient data. Yet, the traditional social and "municipal" leaders, especially in the German-speaking Tyrolean rural areas, were the innkeepers ("writhe" in German), not the landowners or priests.<sup>81</sup>

The tradition of free peasant communities that were not subject to any feudal lords, which was a characteristic of both the Swiss cantons and of the German-speaking areas of the Tyrol, and of some Italian areas in Trentino, played a significant role in promoting the growth of civic culture. The same may be said about the areas with communal civic traditions in Gorizia and Gradiska, Trieste and Istria. Therefore, civic tradition does matter.

My findings are consistent with Putnam's argument that historical legacy explains the differences between, for example, the northern and the southern parts of the Italian peninsula. In southern Italy, the inhabitants of the urban areas do not seem to be, or to have been, more civic than those of the rural areas. The explanation seems to have been the difference between the "Central European" type of urbanization (reasonably clean, orderly, with no shantytowns) in the ex-Habsburg areas and elsewhere, including cities such as Trento<sup>82</sup>, and the "Mediterranean" or "Latin American" type of urbanization (shantytowns on the

<sup>81</sup> See Holland, p. 39 and passim, and Baillie-Grohman, p. 102.

<sup>82</sup> Holland writes that "this ancient city, which is characterized nowadays by a cleanliness and order so often found wanting in Italian towns". See Holland, p. 235 Also see WD McCracken, *The Tyrol* (London: Duckworth & Co, 1905), p. 239.

outskirts etc.) in most of Italy, and especially in its southern part.<sup>83</sup> Moreover, some of the towns of the Trentino (e.g., Rovereto) were more civic than the local countryside because they were built and settled by the Venetians during their brief rule in the area.<sup>84</sup>

I would argue that Habsburg rule in itself did not have a great deal of explanatory power in accounting for the levels of civic culture. The factors that do are civic traditions and urban residence. Other elements of modernization (education, switch from agriculture to other occupations, etc.) do not have a great deal of explanatory power. Sometimes, they even operate in the opposite direction from the one expected on the basis of common sense, or of variations of modernization theory.

### Conclusions

This article evaluates and tests Robert D. Putnam's theory concerning the historical origins (and, more precisely, civic traditions, the independent variable) of civic culture (the dependent variable) as well as the main alternative perspective, which is a variation of modernization theory. In the first part of the article, I presented and evaluated the competing theories proposed by Putnam and Huntington in a broad context. The second part has actually tested the various theories. This has been accomplished through the use of data dealing with Italy, and, to a much lesser extent, with Romania. The Italian cases that I have selected cover those geographical areas for which Putnam does not use pre-1918 statistical data, more precisely those ex-Austrian areas that united with Italy after World War I. Some of the same types of data have been used in the same manner as Putnam has done, for geographically larger units, with an emphasis on the plentiful electoral turnout data. I have looked at the smallest geographical areas for which data is available as the unit of analysis.

One of the interesting findings of the study is that in general, and in Italy in particular, there is more than one type of civic culture. Particularly in the rural areas, civic tradition has a great deal of explanatory power. Among "modernization" variables, in the areas without a civic tradition, urbanization, or rather the type of urbanization characteristic of Central Europe rather than the Mediterranean and/or Latin America, is the only major "modernization" variable that helps to account for the intensity of civic culture. In some areas, ethnicity has some impact, but not as much as it might seem. Overall, Robert Putnam's *Making Democracy Work* is a better starting point than many other works, and clearly a great work and already a classic. Yet, I would argue that his analysis of civic culture should be amended along the lines suggested and/or discussed in this article. Meticulous successive approximation is not easy, but it should not be discouraged in the belief that one can not surpass the classics.

<sup>83</sup> Paul Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics 1943-1988* (Penguin Books, 1990), passim.

<sup>84</sup> See Holland, p. 250.

### Appendix A.

Names of the Electoral Districts, Divided by Areas	
	on
<b>Trieste, Gorz and Gradiska, and Istria</b>	
City of Trieste	
City of Trieste (II and VI)	
City of Trieste (III and IV)	
Suburb Grotta	
Suburb Scoreola	
City of Trieste (V)	
Suburb Chiadino	
City of Trieste (I)	
Suburb Chiarbola Superiore	
<b>Hinterland of Trieste</b>	
<b>Gorizia and Gradiska</b>	
City of Gorz (Gorizia)	
Gorz	
Komen	
Sesana	
Cervignano	
Monfalcone	
Comons	
Gradisca	

<sup>85</sup> The electoral results of the Reichsratswahlen in den Provinzen der Österreich-Ungarischen Monarchie using the German version.

<sup>86</sup> It includes the provincial major ones in each state.

Appendix A. Table of the District-by-District Electoral Patterns in 1911<sup>85</sup>

Names of the Electoral Districts, Divided by Areas	Turnout in the 1911 Elections as a Percentage of the Electorate		Ethnic Make-up of the Population (Percentage) in 1910 According to Colloquial Language				History (Civic Tradition or Not)
	First or only Round	Second Round	Italian (or, in the Ladin ethnic areas, Ladin)	Slovene	German	Other <sup>86</sup>	
<b>Trieste, Gorz and Gradiska, and Istria</b>							
<b>City of Trieste</b>							
City of Trieste (II and VI)	81.53	79.01	79.15	15.91		4.94	Civic (communal)
City of Trieste (III and IV)	82.49	74.81	67.67	18.95		13.39	Civic (communal)
Suburb Greta	85.45	70.43	45.91	49.03		5.06	Civic (communal)
Suburb Scoreola	85.90	77.13	45.91	43.26		10.83	Civic (communal)
City of Trieste (V)	79.58		85.37	10.44		4.19	Civic (communal)
Suburb Chiadino	85.48		72.81	20.29		6.90	Civic (communal)
City of Trieste (I)	80.07	76.90	66.29	16.09		17.61	Civic (communal)
Suburb Chiarbola Superiore	85.76	82.47	68.07	28.14		3.78	Civic
<b>Hinterland of Trieste</b>	88.22		27.82	67.67		4.51	Civic (communal)
<b>Gorizia and Gradiska</b>							
City of Gorz (Gorizia)	72.00	49.42	50.56	36.84		12.6	Mostly non-civic (hierarchical)
Gorz	56.31		0.91	98.18		0.91	Mostly non-civic (hierarchical)
Komen	64.16	56.40	1.74	97.48		0.78	Mostly non-civic (hierarchical)
Sesana	61.40	66.76	0.59	98.61		0.8	Mostly non-civic (hierarchical)
Cervignano	83.10		99.42	0.16		0.42	Civic (communal)
Monfalcone	84.57		87.74	8.34		3.92	Civic (communal)
Cormons	68.59		74.27	23.89		1.84	Half civic (communal)
Gradisca	81.11		97.18	2.23		0.59	Mostly civic (communal)

<sup>85</sup> The electoral results for 1911, and the ethnic statistics for 1910, are available in, "Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen in den im Reichsrat Vertretenen Königreichen und Ländern im Jahre 1911", passim. I am using the German version of the names of the areas.

<sup>86</sup> It includes the percentage of the population made up of all the linguistic groups except for the two major ones in each statistical unit.

Names of the Electoral Districts, Divided by Areas	Turnout in the 1911 Elections as a Percentage of the Electorate		Ethnic Make-up of the Population (Percentage) in 1910 According to Colloquial Language				History (Civic Tradition or Not)
	First or only Round	Second Round	Italian (or, in the Ladin ethnic areas, Ladin)	Slovene	German	Other <sup>86</sup>	
Lucinico	66.91		91.13	8.87		0	Half civic (communal)
<b>Istria</b>							
Capodistria (part currently in Italy)	68.14		3.41	96.5		0.09	Colonial-civic
<b>Areas currently in Slovenia, disputed with Italy in 1945-1947</b>							
<b>Gorizia and Gradiska</b>							
Tolmein	33.41		13.73	78.61		7.66	Non-civic (hierarchical)
Canale	36.38		99.44	0.16		0.4	Non-civic (hierarchical)
Karfreit	33.67		14.35	79.91		5.74	Non-civic (hierarchical)
Flitsch	25.11		0.14	99.19		0.67	Non-civic (hierarchical)
<b>Istria</b>							
Capodistria (part currently in Slovenia)	42.60		78.72	20.01		1.27	Mostly non-civic (hierarchical), colonial-civic
<b>South Tyrol and Trentino</b>							
<b>Trentino (Italian Ethnic Area)</b>							
<b>Rural Areas</b>							
Cles	70.41		99.17		0.01	0.82	Indirect civic
Fondo	64.08		99.54		0.46	0	Indirect civic
Male	54.88		98.32		1.68	0	Partly indirect civic
Rovereto	48.17	55.86	99.66		0.04	0.30	Non-civic
Ala	80.23	84.83	99.75		0.02	0	Indirect civic (long period)
Mori	58.32	73.28	99.88		0.12	0	Indirect civic
Villa Lagarina	68.93	82.42	99.83		0.17	0	Indirect civic
Borgo	44.63		98.05		1.95	0	Non-civic
Levico	28.21		93.78		6.22	0	Non-civic
Fassa	28.42		99.71		0.29	0	Non-civic
Primiero	41.14		97.75		2.25	0	Non-civic
Civezzano	53.68		97.38		2.62	0	Non-civic

<sup>86</sup> It includes the percentage of the population made up of all the linguistic groups except for the two major ones in each statistical unit.

Names of the Electoral Districts, Divided by Areas	
Cavalase	
Trient	
Stenico	
Vezzano	
Pergine	
Condino	
Tione	
Val di Ledro	
Riva	
Arco	
Mezzolombardo	
Lavis	
Cambria	
<b>Cities</b>	
Trient	
<b>Towns</b>	
Rovereto	
Riva	
Arco	
Ala	
Mori	
<b>South Tyrol (German and Ladin Ethnic Areas)</b>	
<b>German Ethnic Areas</b>	
<b>Cities</b>	
Bozen	
Meran	
<b>Towns</b>	
Lienz	
Bruneck	

<sup>86</sup> It includes the major ones in each stat

History (Civic Tradition or Not)
6
Half civic (communal)
Colonial-civic
Non-civic (hierarchical)
Non-civic (hierarchical)
Non-civic (hierarchical)
Non-civic (hierarchical)
7
Mostly non-civic (hierarchical), colonial-civic
2
Indirect civic
Indirect civic
Partly indirect civic
0
Non-civic
Indirect civic (long period)
Indirect civic
Non-civic
Non-civic
Non-civic
Non-civic

Names of the Electoral Districts, Divided by Areas	Turnout in the 1911 Elections as a Percentage of the Electorate		Ethnic Make-up of the Population (Percentage) in 1910 According to Colloquial Language				History (Civic Tradition or Not)
	First or only Round	Second Round	Italian (or, in the Ladin ethnic areas, Ladin)	Slovene	German	Other <sup>86</sup>	
Cavalase	36.98		96.02		3.98	0	Non-civic
Trient	56.11		99.68		0.03	0.29	Non-civic
Stenico	58.55		99.89		0.01	0.10	Non-civic
Vezzano	71.82		99.98		0.00	0.02	Indirect civic (long)
Pergine	52.44		88.16		11.84	0	Non-civic
Condino	52.97		99.58		0.41	0.01	Non-civic
Tione	48.70		98.63		1.37	0	Non-civic
Val di Ledro	53.04		99.8		0.02	0.18	Non-civic
Riva	57.68		98.53		1.47	0	Less civic (?), 1/2 indirect
Arco	59.12		99.55		0.04	0.41	Partly indirect civic
Mezzolombardo	62.94		98.58		1.42	0	Partly indirect civic
Lavis	59.47		99.55		0.04	0.41	Partly indirect civic (?)
Cambra	46.44		99.90		0.1	0	Non-civic
<b>Cities</b>							
Trient	70.30	70.54	89.55		10.45	0	Non-civic
<b>Towns</b>							
Rovereto	82.04	81.35	92.14		7.86	0	Historically mostly non-civic
Riva	64.55	60.52	86.09		13.91	0	Non-civic
Arco	69.77	68.53	87.83		12.12	0.05	Indirect Civic
Ala	65.34	62.65	96.36		3.63	0.01	Non-civic
Mori	80.24	57.55	99.91		0.1	0	Indirect Civic
<b>South Tyrol (German and Ladin Ethnic Areas)</b>							
<b>German Ethnic Areas</b>							
<b>Cities</b>							
Bozen	71.25	73.07	4.78		95.22	0	Civic
Meran	77.36	77.20	4.52		94.48	1.00	Civic
<b>Towns</b>							
Lienz	91.31		100		100	0	Civic
Bruneck	75.49		1.99		98.1	0	Civic

<sup>86</sup> It includes the percentage of the population made up of all the linguistic groups except for the two major ones in each statistical unit.

groups except for the two

Names of the Electoral Districts, Divided by Areas	Turnout in the 1911 Elections as a Percentage of the Electorate		Ethnic Make-up of the Population (Percentage) in 1910 According to Colloquial Language				History (Civic Tradition or Not)
	First or only Round	Second Round	Italian (or, in the Ladin ethnic areas, Ladin)	Slovene	German	Other <sup>86</sup>	
Brixen	78.49		2.95		97.05	0	Non-civic
Klausen	76.42				100	0	Civic
Innichen	86.33		0.04		99.56	0.40	Civic
Welsberg	91.27		0.01		99.87	0.12	Civic
Niederdorf	87.90		0.03		99.7	0	Civic
Toblach	89.54		2.58		97.42	0	Civic
Gossensass	83.87				100	0	Civic
Sterzing	67.33		0.01		99.89	0.10	Civic
Gries	71.31		5.05		94.95	0	Non-civic
Zwölfmalgreien	57.59		7.53		92.47	0	Non-civic
Obermais	68.19		0.06		99.35	0.59	Civic
<b>Rural Areas</b>							
Meran	81.20		4.68		95.32	0	Civic
Passerier	71.66		1.5		98.5	0	Civic
Schlanders	78.94		0.04		99.68	0.28	Civic
Glurns	72.42		0.03		99.68	0.29	Civic
Lana	73.45		1.35		98.65	0	Civic
Kaltern	77.46		4.91		95.09	0	Civic
Neumarkt	77.37		14.45		85.46	0.09	Civic
Cavalese (German part)	71.19		3.25		96.75	0	Civic
Fondo (German part)	81.93		0.96		99.04	0	Civic
Cles (German part)	80		2.6		94.40	3.00	Civic
Bozen	77.51		3.98		96.02	0	Partly civic
Sarnthal	67.67		0.54		99.46	0	Partly civic
Kastelruth	56.76		47.23		52.77	0	Partly civic
Brixen	81.90		1.89		98.11	0	Partly civic
Sterzing	84.58		0.15		99.85	0	Civic
Klausen	77.10		0.42		99.58	0	Mostly civic
Bruneck	76.78		2.55		97.45	0	Mostly civic
Taufers	70.68		0.08		99.92	0	Mostly civic
Welsberg	80.96		0.17		99.83	0	Civic
<b>Ladin Ethnic Areas</b>							

<sup>86</sup> It includes the percentage of the population made up of all the linguistic groups except for the two major ones in each statistical unit.


Names of the Electoral Districts, Divided by Areas
Towns
Ampezzo
Rural areas
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Buchenstein
Currently in Austria
Lienz
Windischmatrei
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## Appendix I in 1

First and Second Round



Farben




<sup>87</sup> The map was prepared by the Reichsrats-Verwaltung, Vienna, 1912. The legend indicates "more or above," and "more or below," and "compulsory voting."



History (Civic Tradition or Not)
Non-civic
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Partly civic
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Names of the Electoral Districts, Divided by Areas	Turnout in the 1911 Elections as a Percentage of the Electorate		Ethnic Make-up of the Population (Percentage) in 1910 According to Colloquial Language				History (Civic Tradition or Not)
	First or only Round	Second Round	Italian (or, in the Ladin ethnic areas, Ladin)	Slovene	German	Other <sup>86</sup>	
<b>Towns</b>							
Ampezzo	55.34		89.88		10.12	0	Civic
<b>Rural areas</b>							
Ennerberg	71.06		97.66		2.34	0	Mostly civic
Buchenstein	40.80		97.01		2.99	0	Mostly non-civic
<b>Currently in Austria</b>							
Lienz	77.44		0.02		99.98	0	Civic
Windischmattei	73.37		0.11		99.89	0	Civic
Sillian	83.33		0.46		99.54	0	Civic

Appendix B. Map of the Electoral Turnouts in 1911, District by District, in Trieste, Gorizia-Gradiska, Trentino and South Tyrol<sup>87</sup>



<sup>87</sup> The map was taken from an insert at the end of "Die Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen in den im Reichsrath Vertretenen Königreichen und Ländern im Jahre 1911", and it was compiled by Freytag and Berndt, Vienna, 1912. The electoral turnouts are presented as percentages. The word "über" in German means "over" or "above", and "mit Wahlpflicht" means "compulsory voting". "Ohne Wahlpflicht" means "without compulsory voting", and "Wahlbezirksgrenzen" means "the boundaries of electoral districts".

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
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No. 1

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